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1 Introduction 
The financial services industry has faced one of the hardest challenges in history 
during the financial crisis. Although there is no consensus about the beginning 
of the financial crisis, global financial market indicators began to decline in 
2007. I will consider the time period from 01/2007-12/2009 as the time period of 
the financial crisis. 
Figure 1.1: Global Financial Market Indicators (index 1992=100) 
 
Supervisory authorities, politicians and international organizations were forced 
to oppose a spillover effect on the economy with unprecedented measures. Huge 
amounts of government bailouts and state guarantees were necessary in order to 
calm down the hysterics on the financial markets. Not only did the financial 
crisis lead to slurping market prices but also the awareness of commonly 
accepted low risk investments like government bonds was challenged. As a 
consequence, the exploding state deficits prior to the financial crisis and the 
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enormous bailouts during the financial crisis have resulted in general mistrust 
from capital market participants. 
One aspect that is widely expressed of causing this development is linked to an 
increase in risky investments along with complex structures. Structured finance 
is one of the heavily criticized forms of complex investments. There exist many 
sub-forms of structured finance but securitizations are a key aspect in the 
financial crisis and the focus of this dissertation. 
Despite the fact that the origin of securitization is traced back to the early 1970’s 
(Loutskina 2011), the impressive growth rate in terms of outstanding volume 
was promoted by favorable legislation. Financial institutions are obliged to hold 
a certain amount of equity for its risk positions. In this context, rating grades are 
supposed to express the riskiness or debt quality so that high rating grades 
determine less equity to be held by the financial institution. Securitization deals 
are commonly structured in several tranches ranging from the senior tranche to 
the equity tranche. As repayments follow the waterfall principle meaning that 
the senior tranche is first repaid and then mezzanine and equity tranches, it is 
conclusive that senior tranches benefit from the best rating grade of a 
securitization deal.  
Astonishing is the fact that the senior tranches were oftentimes given the best 
possible rating grade, commonly understood as triple-A tranches (He et al. 
2011). This implicates that defaults of the senior tranches should occur as a very 
unlikely event. When investigating the validity of this assumption, it needs to be 
explained that securitization deals are constructed as bankruptcy-remote 
structured finance products and its quality is determined by the reference assets. 
The construction assumes that the securitization deal should be treated as an 
isolated investment opportunity. Given this assumption, securitization (more 
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specifically senior tranches with high rating grades) could be an interesting 
investment opportunity for capital market participants. 
As such, institutional investors are dominant capital market participants who 
invest large sums on capital markets (Davis and Steil 2001). Due to this fact, 
supervisory authorities pose restrictions to their investment practices. 
Institutional investors are primarily life insurers, pension funds, mutual funds, 
hedge funds, university endowments, private equity investors, etc. When 
analyzing the investment practices of institutional investors in several countries, 
it becomes apparent that there are distinctive differences. Bringing this into 
context with structured finance, it is of interest which portfolio structure is best 
under the constraints of the investment principles and whether securitization 
adds value to the portfolio. In order to respond to this issue it is necessary to 
analyze the investment principles of institutional investors and then evaluate the 
portfolio risk and return characteristics. Since institutional investors are long 
term investors with a rather low risk affinity, it is consistent that financial 
products are eligible in the portfolio when these are profitable at low risk. 
Despite of the impressive growth rate of structured finance, the sudden loss of 
investor confidence in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis resulted in a 
substantial sell-off. This investor behavior is rather intuitive because investors 
are more conscious of risk in turbulent market conditions and may evade 
complex financial products like structured finance. Along with imperfect market 
conditions comes the challenge of fair valuation. The more complex a financial 
product is structured, the more assumptions with regard to market environment 
are generally in force. Callable bonds are a financial product consisting of a 
standard bond and an embedded option that is rather complex to price (Acharya 
and Carpenter 2002). Consequently, in the absence of transparent pricing, 
financial products become less interesting for investors. 
4 
 
This dissertation explores three research questions in order to better understand 
capital market perceptions during the financial crisis: 
1. Do rating announcements of securitized products affect the financial 
institution? 
2. Can institutional investors benefit from securitization? 
3. Do valuation models of the option premium in callable bonds reflect 
market prices under stress? 
First research question: 
In an empirical analysis investigating rating announcements on collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO) as a sub-form of securitization, I illustrate that rating 
announcements of CDO are not considered as isolated events with regard to the 
originating financial institution. Applying an event study methodology, I show 
that the impact stemming from CDO rating announcements is intense around the 
event day but quickly absorbed by the market. The sample consists of 238 
events covering financial institutions from USA, UK and Germany. The sub-
sample analyses present that time and regime differences exist. The intensity of 
rating announcements is most pronounced prior to the financial crisis when the 
reliance on high rating grades of CDO was distinctive. Market perception has 
changed during the financial crisis when rating downgrades were expected 
resulting in less significant findings. The analysis provides evidence of a switch 
in terms of investor behavior. While the trusting investor was dominant prior to 
the financial crisis, a transition towards the sophisticated investor has taken 
place where possible downgrades were already expected and so less surprising. 
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Second research question: 
The second research question is two-fold. At first, I present that investment 
principles of institutional investors have a tendency either following the prudent 
person rule or quantitative portfolio restrictions. The prudent person rule 
suggests that decisions should be taken to the best of one’s knowledge and 
judgment whereas quantitative portfolio restrictions determine the maximum 
share of each portfolio component. In this context, securitization is not explicitly 
restricted from being included in the portfolio of institutional investors. At 
second, I present that the prudent person rule is superior to the quantitative 
portfolio restriction approach but exposed to higher volatility at the same time. 
Additionally, covering a time span from 1992-2011 the performance of 
securitization was very volatile in the financial crisis with a sharp decline. Given 
this outcome, I show that securitization is only favorable for institutional 
investors prior to the financial crisis. The study explains the plummeting market 
prices of securitization since primarily institutional investors were forced to sell 
securitization in order to minimize total portfolio risk. 
Third research question: 
The pricing of the option premium in callable bonds is derived from the 
valuation models of Black (1976) for single-callable bonds and Ho and Lee 
(1986) and the extension of Bühler and Schulze (1993) for multi-callable bonds. 
Callable bonds consist of a standard bond and an embedded option. Applying a 
case study approach with a dataset of Commerzbank, I detect an intense 
deviation between market quotes and model-conform prices during the financial 
crisis. This stands in contrast to the findings in the pre-crisis period where 
model-conform prices converge with market quotes. Interestingly, the mismatch 
of model prices from market prices is triggered by the announcement of 
government support for Commerzbank in November 2008. This outcome is 
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quite surprising since the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was 
expected to cause a contagion effect on the financial services industry. The 
study provides evidence that concerns in terms of credit quality of the financial 
institution is the key driver of valuation mismatches and not contagion effects 
from other defaulted financial institutions. 
After presenting the motivation and key findings in chapter 1, the 
aforementioned studies are presented in chapter 2 to 4. Chapter 5 summarizes 
the overall dissertation and gives suggestions for future research. Each study is 
composed of an introductory part, literature review, data and methodology 
section, presentation of results and a summary.  
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2 Impact of CDO Rating Announcements on the Share Price1 
In the recent financial crisis, banks have suffered from a lack of credibility and 
the exposure to elevated risk. A number of banks have called for government 
bailouts or were forced to merge with other financial institutions (Veronesi and 
Zingales 2010). The involvement in securitization transactions was one of the 
reasons why banks faced severe turbulences. In this context, rating grades are an 
instrument to express credibility to the market. The direction of credit ratings 
was dominated by downgrade announcements in the banking industry during the 
financial crisis.  
Our motivation is to explore the impact of rating announcements in relation to 
the bank’s shareholder value. While most studies examine the long term debt 
quality or the bank’s issuer rating, we enhance research by including the impact 
of structured finance products, namely rating implications of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO). We infer share price response from negative rating outlooks 
and rating downgrades applying event study methodology and differentiate 
between CDO and the bank’s issuer rating announcements. 
To understand capital market reactions regarding CDO rating announcements, 
we consider the often bemoaned behavioral patterns: 
1. Rating shopping and rating grade inflation: structured finance became a 
considerable profit contributor for rating agencies. As rating agencies are 
paid by the issuer, conflicts of interest may arise when inflated rating 
grades are given (Sangiorgi et al. 2009). The phenomenon of inflated 
rating grades is also emphasized for complex products (Skreta and 
Veldkamp 2009). 
                                           
1 I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck and Dr. Frank Lehrbass for helpful insights and comments. 
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2. Reputation of rating agencies: a rating grade is supposed to reflect an 
approximate assessment of the credit quality of an entity or a financial 
product. When there are many adjustments in a short period of time, the 
market may question the competence of rating agencies. While rating 
agencies claim that reputation is a key element for their business, Mathis 
et al. (2009) show that if the major source of income comes from complex 
products, ratings become too lax. This implies that reputation concerns 
are not taken serious. 
3. Sophisticated or trusting investor: investor behavior can be differentiated 
between sophisticated investors who put additional efforts to better 
understand their investments and trusting investors who rely on available 
information like rating grades. The trusting investor may dominate in 
economic boom times but underestimate the actual level of risk in times 
of low default rates. In contrary, the sophisticated investor may dominate 
when the quality of CDO deals is questioned and downgrades are 
expected. Adelino (2009) analyzes under what conditions investors rely 
on rating grades. He provides evidence that information at origination 
other than rating grades contain information with predictive power. 
4. Informational asymmetry: information about banks and its products are 
brought to public attention in various ways. Information about the bank is 
widely available, whereas information about a particular CDO deal is 
scarce. Therefore, we expect differing observations about when new 
information is incorporated. 
Taking these aspects into consideration, we show under what circumstances 
rating announcements have an impact on the bank’s shareholder value. We 
apply event study methodology with short term and long term equity price 
effects from CDO and the bank’s issuer rating announcements. The short term 
event study includes equity price response of up to 20 days before and 20 days 
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after the actual announcement day. In the long term performance study we 
analyze the interdependence between equity and rating announcements with a 
three months anticipation and post announcement observation. The stock-listed 
banks considered in this sample are headquartered in Europe and the USA with 
a strong activity in CDO. 
The most important finding is informational asymmetry. We observe highly 
negative equity price response from CDO rating announcements around the 
announcement day but no lead and lag effect. This stands in contrast to the 
findings referring to the bank’s issuer rating. In this case we do not detect any 
significant share price reaction around the announcement day, but a highly 
significant lead and lag effect. We explain this outcome with widely available 
information about the issuing bank but little information about the specific 
characteristics of a given CDO deal. 
Furthermore, we find evidence of regime and time dependency when 
considering the sophisticated or trusting investor theorem. In the observation 
period from January 1999 until December 2006 the trusting investor dominates. 
The results highlight strong negative share price response. This finding supports 
the investor’s overconfidence idea referring to Statman et al. (2006). When the 
issuance volume of CDO grew constantly, most CDO deals benefited from high 
rating grades. Oftentimes, senior tranches of CDO deals were given the highest 
rating grades. Due to the complexity of CDO, many investors might not have 
been cautious enough to correctly interpret the risk exposure they were facing. 
Instead, they could have taken rating grades as a means of quality measurement. 
This perception has changed once the market noticed that the high rating grades 
of CDO were not justified. In this case, we notice a switch towards the 
sophisticated investor. Rating grade adjustments were expected and this would 
imply no abnormal returns. Instead, there are still negative abnormal returns 
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observed in the time period from January 2007 until June 2011. The same 
perception is found when controlling for regime dependency. Rating 
announcements from US banks experience a strong tendency towards the 
sophisticated investor behavior as the low quality of securitizations was rather 
linked to US banks. This result is quite striking as CDO - or securitized products 
in general - should have a limited feedback channel to the bank in case of 
defaults (Benveniste and Berger (1987); Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995)).2 So 
the question arises why the sophisticated investor takes downgrade 
announcements as an indicator of potential risk. 
In theory, risk associated with CDO deals is transferred to a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) that issues bonds to investors in different tranches ranging from 
the senior tranche to the equity tranche that is mostly held by the originating 
bank. With this process, risk is supposedly transferred from the originator to the 
investor via the bankruptcy-remote SPV. As a result, losses from CDO deals 
should hardly affect the originating bank above the equity tranche. More 
precisely, banks need to make impairments for just the equity tranche. If the 
equity tranche is already written down, there is no need for further impairments. 
Nevertheless, the reality of the CDO market showed much more complexity. 
Some forms of CDO can be constructed in a way that the originating bank is a 
broker - rather than an originator - with no first loss piece at all. These single 
tranche CDO have no feedback channel to the originating bank. Still, the 
sophisticated investor might be concerned about the general reputation of the 
bank if other investors do not distinguish to what extent a bank is exposed to 
risk. Even though activity in the CDO market may be considered as a secondary 
business, the bank’s reputation can still be impacted. A further aspect that is still 
rarely addressed is linked to lawsuits. Banks or prosecutors sued originators - or 
                                           
2 At times of growing market share, research highlights the low risk nature of securitized deals. This perception 
has change after the financial crisis. 
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brokers - that they consciously sold low quality assets to investors.3 These 
lawsuits shed a bad light on the bank’s reputation. So concerns arising from 
secondary businesses can indeed impact the bank. Additionally, a characteristic 
of a synthetic CDO deal is that banks held not only the first loss piece but as 
well the super senior tranches which ranked superior to the senior tranches. Due 
to their size, the impairments were considerably high and put a severe threat to 
the involved bank. 
Summarizing, we deliver proof that rating announcements have a material 
impact on the bank’s equity. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. 
We summarize the relevant literature in section 1, section 2 proposes the applied 
data and methodology, section 3 presents the results and section 4 finally 
concludes the research. 
2.1 Literature review 
Rating grades are an established credit quality indicator in the financial industry 
and became even more important with the Basel II framework by determining 
the regulatory capital requirement based on external ratings. We expect 
significant market response from rating announcements given the high relevance 
of rating grades. 
Implications of rating announcements have been researched in various ways. 
One study related to our analysis refers to Higgins et al. (2009) who document 
that rating downgrades of asset backed securities (ABS) induce significant 
negative share price reactions and lengthen future securitization issuing. While 
past research concentrated on the implications of long term rating grades for 
bonds, research has extended to examine derivative products like credit default 
                                           
3 Financial Times from Nov. 10, 2010: “Goldman Sachs junk CDO trouble – again”. 
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swaps (CDS) as well. A comprehensive overview of rating implications exists in 
Norden and Weber (2004) and Trutwein and Schiereck (2011).  
Referring to the theoretical building blocks of our analysis, there is evidence of 
the rating shopping and inflated rating grade phenomenon. Bongaerts et al. 
(2012) and Becker and Milbourn (2011) highlight that the more rating agencies 
issue rating grades on the same entity, the less efficient they become. If there are 
two rating agencies, one providing investment grade and the other non-
investment grade status, then the third rating agency comes up as a tiebreaker. 
The study presents that it is more likely that the tiebreaker tends towards the 
investment grade status. This perception is supported by Bolton et al. (2012). 
The importance of multiple rating grades is also emphasized by Kisgen and 
Strahan (2010) resulting in lower costs of capital.  
Bolton et al. (2012) and Faltin-Traeger (2009) document that it is more likely 
that rating agencies issue better rating grades for repeated or large issuers. The 
results are in line with He et al. (2011) who show that large issuers with less 
tranches have larger triple-A senior tranches. Interestingly, prices for triple-A 
senior tranches from large issuers dropped significantly in the financial crisis. 
Reputation is an issue for rating agencies who argue that a lax rating approval 
would impact the reputation. However, Mathis et al. (2009) outline that there are 
indications that reputation concerns are not taken serious. They discover that 
rating agencies first build up reputation in order to generate fees for inflated 
ratings later on. The probability of inflated ratings and, hence, reputation 
concerns raises when the major source of income comes from rating complex 
products.  
According to the sophisticated or trusting investor theorem, Bolton et al. (2012) 
perceive that in booms the investor does not scrutinize inflated ratings and so 
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making the investor vulnerable to high risk and forced selling when the 
performance strongly declines (Ambrose et al. 2008). Securitizations have been 
regarded as a means of risk transfer. Instefjord (2005) examined the impact of 
derivative structures that are used particularly in synthetic securitizations. These 
techniques favor risk-taking that could destabilize banks. 
Generally, given the high relevance of rating grades, Rajan et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that certain information, other than what is reported to the investor, 
may be neglected and favor informational asymmetry. This is underlined by the 
results of Ivashina (2009) who shows that risk premiums are generally higher for 
less transparent products. Since we differentiate between CDO and the bank’s 
issuer rating, we argue that information about CDO is less available and so it is 
conclusive that market participants ask for higher yields. 
2.2 Data and methodology 
2.2.1 Data 
We extract data from several sources. For equity market prices we use Thomson 
Reuters and for rating announcements Bloomberg. We select the total return 
prices that take stock splits and dividend payments into account. In order to 
select data for CDO as our first proxy to represent the debt quality, we narrow 
the search for rating announcements by selecting CDO as issue type. In terms of 
linking the issuer of the CDO deal to the originator, we identify the SPV as the 
investment vehicle of the bank. 
Rating agencies evaluate each tranche of a CDO deal independently. In common 
practice, rating agencies publish rating announcements on a number of tranches 
belonging to the same CDO deal simultaneously. As long as rating 
announcements occur for the same CDO deal in the largest event window [-20; 
20], we consider the first announcement as our event date. This seems justified 
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because the downgrade of a CDO tranche can imply the downgrade of the 
subordinated tranches due to the loss allocation scheme inherent in CDO deals. 
Due to this fact rating announcements include negative rating outlooks and 
rating downgrades in this study. We consider confounding events when there are 
rating announcements on more than one CDO deal from the same bank in our 
largest event window [-20; 20]. We try to relate only one rating event as the 
indicator of abnormal returns in our observation. With this approach we 
considerably reduce our sample size. 
The sample consists of CDO rating announcements from banks headquartered in 
Europe and the USA. We select all downgrade announcements in the time 
period from January 1999 until June 2011. From 6002 rating announcements for 
US banks and 2007 rating announcements for European banks, we consolidate 
the list by filtering CDO from stock-listed banks. We get 1227 rating 
announcements for US banks and 1743 announcements for European banks. 
After that we select banks with a considerable activity in CDO. This refers to 
banks with high total outstanding volume and several years of activity in 
securitization or CDO.4 This leaves us with 513 rating announcements for US 
banks and 765 rating announcements for European banks. We consolidate rating 
announcements of CDO tranches belonging to the same CDO deal as one event 
if they occur in the event window [-20; 20]. The remaining events consist of 83 
events from US banks and 176 events from European banks. Now we identify 
confounding events by disallowing major events that are disclosed during the 
event window [-20; 20] in order to diminish bias.5 Exemplarily, on the day 
Lehman Brothers claimed for bankruptcy, a wave of CDO rating downgrades 
corresponding to Lehman Brothers and other banks were disclosed. As a bank 
failure is obviously a major confounding event, we exclude such an event from 
                                           
4 Outstanding volume in securitization / CDO > $ 100 million and years of activity in securitization> 10 years. 
5 Here we selected corporate news published in newspaper or journals such as the Financial Times and Wall 
Street Journal. 
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our sample. Our final sample size of 238 events consists of 72 events from US 
banks and 166 events from European banks. 
CDO started to receive investor attention in the past decade. We take this into 
account and limit our time horizon from January 1999 until June 2011. We 
define a subsample from January 1999 until December 2006 and a subsample 
from January 2007 until June 2011 in order to control for time dependency with 
the rise and fall of the CDO market. 
Table 2.1: Sample characterization, CDO rating announcements 
Events per year 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
France 
  
2 3 
     
2 1 1 1 10 
Germany 
 
1 1 6 8 8 11 20 27 20 12 
 
3 117 
Netherlands 
      
2 2 
 
2 1 
  
7 
Spain 
       
2 
 
1 
  
1 4 
Switzerland 
       
4 4 2 1 4 
 
15 
UK 
       
3 4 
 
2 3 1 13 
USA 1           37 2   3 7 13 9 72 
Total 1 1 3 9 8 8 50 33 35 30 24 21 15 238 
 
After identifying CDO rating announcements as a first proxy for the debt 
quality, we select the bank’s issuer rating as a second proxy. The rating 
methodology differs between the three largest rating agencies Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. Nonetheless, market participants have a common 
understanding of the rating methodologies and the adaptations of each rating 
agency (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Livingston and Jewell (1998)). Given 
this assumption, we retrieve the bank’s issuer rating announcements only from 
Moody’s. 
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We notice that negative rating outlooks and downgrades took place at the end of 
the 1990s with several financial crises and during the financial crisis 2007-2009 
and in 2011. Rating upgrades or positive rating outlooks took place mostly 
during the new economy boom and prior to the financial crisis. In order to 
obtain consistent findings of the impact of rating grades, only negative rating 
outlooks and rating downgrades of banks involved in the CDO market are taken 
into account. With this approach we come to a sample size of 52 events in the 
period from January 1999 until June 2011. Due to the limited number of events, 
we do not run subsample analysis. 
Table 2.2: Sample characterization, bank’s issuer rating announcements 
Events per year 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
France          1 1 1 4 7 
Germany 2  3 2 1 1     5 1 2 17 
Spain             2 2 
Switzerland 3            1 4 
UK          1 1  2 4 
USA         1 5 4 2 6 18 
Total 5 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 1 7 11 4 17 52 
 
2.2.2 Methodology 
We measure stock price reactions implicated by rating announcements. For that 
purpose, we apply an event study approach that is designed to quantify abnormal 
returns within a specified event period. We apply the adjusted market model 
approach by calculating the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) according to 
(MacKinlay 1997): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑡0−𝜏,𝑡0+𝜏] = � (𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑡0+𝜏𝑡=𝑡0−𝜏 − 𝛼�𝑖 − 𝛽�𝑖 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)  
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Where Ri,t is the return of the originating bank at time t, Rm,t is the security’s 
market return at time t, 𝛼�𝑖 and 𝛽�𝑖 are parameters derived from the ordinary least 
square regression with the estimation period beginning 200 days before the 
event and a lag time of 30 days in order to avoid leakage effects. We evaluate 
statistical significance for the different event window cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR). The largest event window in our observation is set 
equal to 41 days, starting 20 business days before and ending 20 business days 
after a rating announcement. We subdivide our analysis in 9 time intervals and 
repeat them for all subsamples. In addition to standard t-test statistics, we test 
event-induced increases in variance (Boehmer et al. 1991). The non-parametric 
test is conducted by applying the Wilcoxon test. 
In order to control for anticipation and post announcement effects, we calculate 
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) according to Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) with monthly returns three months before and after the event: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑚,𝑡  
Where BHRi,t is the stock’s return at time t and BHRm,t is the market’s return at 
time t. In addition, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis and control for 
heteroskedasticity (White 1980). 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Short term analysis: CDO vs. bank’s issuer rating announcements 
In a first analysis referring to CDO rating announcements we investigate 
whether the market considers rating announcements of CDO deals to affect the 
bank. The results in the overall 238 event sample indicate highly significant 
abnormal returns with CAAR= -0.59% (t-value = -4.175) right on the event day 
[0; 0]. The results suggest that CDO rating announcements are a valid indicator 
in terms of enhanced risk for the bank’s shareholders. The wealth effects are not 
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lagged and absorbed very quickly by the market. In the event windows [0; 0],   
[-1; 2], [-1; 1] and [0; 2] we get significantly negative abnormal returns. The 
results highlight that the market assesses that risk still resides with the bank, 
either in form of reputation risk or possible impairments on the assets. On a 
longer period of event windows, the results turn insignificant. Once the rating 
announcements are absorbed, there are no abnormal returns noticed in larger 
event windows [-5; 5] or [-10; 10]. With a total sample of 238 events it appears 
that investors do not consider CDO rating announcements to be a prime driver in 
their investment decision. 
In order to provide more evidence to our findings, we control for regime and 
time dependency as well. First market distortions in the subprime credit business 
were noticed in 2006. In this context, subprime credit business was rather linked 
to US banks than to European banks. These low quality assets have accounted 
for a great share of the reference assets in CDO deals. Upon the knowledge of 
activity in securitization, the investor may have anticipated rating downgrades 
specifically for US banks. So the reaction of a rating event would imply an 
indifferent market response. In a subsample covering 72 rating events 
corresponding to US banks we deliver proof that the expected weak 
performance of CDO deals from US banks were expected to some extent as we 
obtain little significant negative abnormal returns around the announcement day 
[-1;+1], [0;+0], [-1;+2] and [0;+2]. However, the expectation of fully indifferent 
market response was not validated. 
We argue that the existence of feedback channels elevate the risk of the bank 
since reputation concerns arise as well as impairment requirements. A different 
finding is perceived when analyzing rating announcements corresponding to 
European banks. Here, we find support for the overall results table with strong 
negative abnormal returns around the event day in the event windows [-1; 1], [0; 
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0], [-1; 2] and [0; 2]. The highly significant abnormal return at event day with 
CAAR=-0.65% (t-value=-4,275) illustrates the differing market response in 
terms of regime dependency. 
To further analyze the impact of CDO rating grades, we pursue with a time 
dependency analysis as illustrated in Panel C. Over the last decade CDO have 
gained market attention due to beneficial aspects such as regulatory capital relief 
and credit risk transfer as long as the underlying assets are of low default rates 
(Thomas 1999). We split our analysis into a time period from January 1999 until 
December 2006 and a time period from January 2007 until June 2011 separating 
the growth and sudden fall period of CDO. 
As first market distortions in the credit business were noticed in 2006 and the 
awareness of high default rates became apparent, the assumption that 
securitization / CDO were a low risk investment was questioned. Once the weak 
performance of many subprime credits came to public attention, investors’ 
confidence suffered and rating announcements were widely expected with a 
detrimental effect on the bank’s reputation. We hypothesize that the 
sophisticated investor has already expected rating downgrades resulting in 
indifferent market response especially for rating events after 2007. In the first 
time period from 1999 until 2006 wealth effects are highly significant with 
negative abnormal returns of CAAR= -1.27% (t-value=-4.172) at announcement 
day [0; 0] and CAAR= -0.41% (t-value=-2.674) for the event window [-1; 1]. In 
accordance with our findings from the overall sample and CDO originated from 
European banks, we only obtain significant results in the shortest event windows 
and confirm that CDO rating announcements are quickly incorporated. 
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Table 2.3: Stock price response to CDO rating announcements 
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the CDO originating banks that 
are affected by a rating event (downgrade announcement or negative rating outlook of CDO) 
over the period 1999 to 2011 in our final sample. We first aggregate the portfolio of equally 
weighted equity returns for each rating event. Then, we average these returns across events. 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of the bank, defined from the market model 
estimated over the period (-200, -30). The market model consists of the corresponding local 
index as provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream (DS Code LI). t-statistics are computed 
from the portfolio time-series standard deviation to account for any possible event clustering. 
Boehmer z-score takes event-induced increases in variance into account. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The total sample (Panel A) 
contains 238 rating events. Panel B breaks down the sample across CDO originated from 
European and US banks. Panel C breaks down the sample across rating events from 1999-
2006 and 2007-2011. 
Panel A: Abnormal Equity Returns, Total Sample 
 All events (N=238) 
Day   Mean     t-Statistic   Boehmer z-score 
-10,1 
 
-0.64% 
  
-1,146 
 
-1,509 
-5,1 
 
-0.48% 
  
-1,039 
 
-1,313 
-1,1 
 
-0.72% 
  
-2.854*** 
 
-2.913*** 
-5,5 
 
-0.62% 
  
-1,248 
 
-1,299 
-10,10 
 
-0.74% 
  
-1,244 
 
-1,281 
-20,20 
 
-0.63% 
  
-1,316 
 
-0,769 
0,0 
 
-0.59% 
  
-4.175*** 
 
-4.321*** 
-1,2 
 
-0.74% 
  
-2.596*** 
 
-2.741*** 
0,2   -0.64%     -2.513***   -2.662*** 
Panel B: Abnormal Equity Returns by Region 
 US Banks (N=72)   European Banks (N=166) 
Day Mean t-Statistic Boehmer z-score Mean t-Statistic Boehmer z-score 
-10,1 -1.65% -0.816 -1.061 
 
-0.23% -0,343 -0,460 
-5,1 -1.03% -1,083 -1,149 
 
-0.26% -0,516 -0,709 
-1,1 -0.62% -1.945* -2.190* 
 
-0.75% -2,958*** -3,246*** 
-5,5 -0.71% -0,553 -0,625 
 
-0.59% -1,130 -1,188 
-10,10 -1.28% -1,138 -1,126 
 
-0.52% -0,799 -0,775 
-20,20 0.66% -0,343 0,360 
 
-1.16% -1,338 -1,302 
0,0 -0.49% -2.191** -2.364** 
 
-0.65% -4,275*** -4,289*** 
-1,2 -0.56% -1.985** -2,136** 
 
-0.87% -2,993*** -3,070*** 
0,2 -0.48% -1,495 -1.600 
 
-0.77% -3,197*** -3,123*** 
Panel C: Abnormal Equity Returns by Time Period 
 1999-2006 (N=127)   2007-2011 (N=111) 
Day Mean t-Statistic Boehmer z-score Mean t-Statistic Boehmer z-score 
-10,1 0.08% 0,066 0,247 
 
-0.92% -1.355 -1.494 
-5,1 0.02% 0,021 0,085 
 
-0.50% -1.237 -1.308 
-1,1 -0.41% -2,674*** -2,522** 
 
-1.09% -1.652* -1.734* 
-5,5 0.20% 0,592 0,652 
 
-1.15% -0.742 -1.174 
-10,10 0.52% 0,848 1,152 
 
-0.28% -0.890 -0.771 
-20,20 0.36% 0,391 0,536 
 
0.42% -0.414 0.265 
0,0 -1.27% -4.172*** -4.029*** 
 
-0.35% -2.069** -2.015** 
-1,2 -0.92% -3.747*** -3.643*** 
 
-0.40% -1.782* -1.792* 
0,2 -0.81% -3.112*** -3.244***   -0.53% -1.945* -1.880* 
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After controlling for the time period from 1999-2006 we investigate the effect of 
rating implications from 2007-2011 as this time period stands for the weak 
performance of CDO and little issuance volume. We project that the weak 
performance was expected so that market response should have a limited impact 
on the bank’s share price. Nonetheless, we get little significant negative 
abnormal returns for rating events after 2007. This result is quite striking as 
expected rating announcements should not result in a substantial wealth effect. 
We argue that a shift towards the sophisticated investor has occurred. The 
sophisticated investor does not only incorporate rating announcements, but as 
well other concerns that may arise. The rating grades express the 
creditworthiness of a product and thus are a proxy for reputation risk. 
In contrary to the strong impact of CDO rating grades, we do not observe 
significant abnormal returns around the event day in any of the event windows 
for downgrades referring to the bank’s issuer rating. This is surprising as the 
bank’s issuer rating is of significant importance for a bank’s creditworthiness. 
Due to the few events we do not conduct further subsample analysis with 
regional and time dependency as conducted with CDO rating announcements. In 
addition, we focus on non parametric test statistics due to the few events. In lack 
of significant findings in the short term observation we rather argue that there is 
a distinctive characteristic between the bank’s issuer and CDO rating 
announcement. In contrast to CDO, information about the bank is widely 
available. If investors have already incorporated publicly available information 
about the bank, equity price effects might have taken place well in advance and 
rating announcements are lagged. This would support the informational 
asymmetry theorem. In order to examine lead and lag effects we continue the 
analysis by observing anticipation and post announcement effects. 
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Table 2.4: Stock price response to bank’s issuer rating announcements 
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the CDO originating banks that are 
affected by a rating event (downgrade announcement or negative rating outlook of the bank's 
issuer rating) over the period 1999 to 2011 in our final sample. We first aggregate the portfolio 
of equally weighted equity returns for each rating event. Then, we average these returns across 
events. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of the bank, defined from the market model 
estimated over the period (-200, -30). The market model consists of the corresponding local 
index as provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream (DS Code LI). t-statistics are computed 
from the portfolio time-series standard deviation to account for any possible event clustering. 
Boehmer z-score takes event-induced increases in variance into account. The Wilcoxon test is 
included due to the small sample size. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. The total sample contains 52 rating events. 
Abnormal Equity Returns, Bank's issuer rating total sample 
 All events (N=52) 
Day   Mean     t-Statistic Boehmer z-score Wilcoxon test 
-10,1 
 
-1.29% 
  
-0,378 -0,798 -0,070 
-5,1 
 
-1.28% 
  
-1,221 -1,352 -0,726 
-1,1 
 
-1.64% 
  
-0,482 -0,908 -0,126 
-5,5 
 
-1.26% 
  
-0,516 -0,960 -0,279 
-10,10 
 
-0.38% 
  
0,412 -0,148 0,000 
-20,20 
 
-0.78% 
  
0,035 -0,248 -0,154 
0,0 
 
-0.72% 
  
-0,739 -1,034 -0,223 
-1,2 
 
-0.52% 
  
0,131 -0,368 -0,502 
0,2   -0.60%     0,063 -0,335 -0,307 
 
2.3.2 Long term analysis: CDO vs. bank’s issuer rating announcements 
Our main findings correspond to the informational asymmetry and sophisticated 
or trusting investor theorem. Now, we observe lead and lag effects by 
calculating a long term performance study with monthly BHAR calculation.  
If rating downgrades were expected and already priced, we would expect 
significant abnormal returns to take place before the actual event. The long term 
effect of CDO rating announcements is different. Referring to our above 
mentioned note we pointed out that CDO rating announcements had a wealth 
effect only around the announcement day but no significant findings in the 
largest event window [-20; 20]. The long term BHAR emphasizes the results of 
the short term event study that CDO rating implications are limited to the event 
day since neither anticipation nor post announcement effects are noticed. 
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Table 2.5: Pre-announcement and post-announcement effect 
The table reports Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the CDO originating banks that are affected by a 
rating event (downgrade announcement or negative rating outlook of the bank's issuer rating) over the period 
1999 to 2011 in our final sample. The BHAR is calculated on a monthly basis. The market index consists of the 
corresponding local index as provided by Thomson Reuters Datastream (DS Code LI). t-statistics are computed 
from the portfolio time-series standard deviation to account for any possible event clustering. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is included as a non-parametric test statistics. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: BHAR, Pre-announcement period 
 CDO (N=238)   Issuer Rating (N=52) 
Months Mean t-Statistic Wilcoxon   Mean t-Statistic Wilcoxon 
-3,2 -0.22% -0.256 -0.114 
 
-8.15% -3.545*** -3.531*** 
-3,1 0.27% 0.261 -0.061 
 
-11.89% -5.372*** -4.215*** 
-3,0 0.21% 0.163 -0.471 
 
-14.17% -5.901*** -4.410*** 
 
Panel B: BHAR, Post-announcement period 
 CDO (N=238)   Issuer Rating (N=52) 
Months Mean t-Statistic Wilcoxon   Mean t-Statistic Wilcoxon 
0,1 -0.34% -0.391 -0.700 
 
-4.78% -1.603 -0.740 
0,2 -0.09% -0.079 -0.236 
 
-10.68% -2.860*** -2.604*** 
0,3 0.68% 0.482 -0.174   -13.59% -3.715*** -3.178*** 
 
Derived from the theoretical building blocks, we expect to deliver support for 
informational asymmetry and sophisticated or trusting investor theorem. We 
argue that rating downgrades are just a logical reaction if the bank performance 
is weak. Additionally, investors may foresee the weak development and 
incorporate this in their investment decision. We obtain negative monthly 
BHAR at the 1% significance level in the months prior to the announcement day 
[-3; -2], [-3; -1] and [-3; 0]. In line with the findings of the short term event 
study, the BHAR in the period [0; 1] does not show significant abnormal returns 
for the bank’s issuer rating. Surprisingly, the post announcement effect shows 
significantly negative abnormal returns starting one month after the event day in 
the period [0; 2] and [0; 3]. We conclude that the sophisticated investor 
acknowledges the importance of the bank’s issuer rating and reacts with delayed 
selling. 
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2.3.3 Multivariate regression analysis 
This section reports regression analysis of the bank’s return on explanatory 
variables designed to identify the drivers of abnormal returns. The dependent 
variable is the CAR derived from the event window [0; 0]. We use bank 
characteristics, risk categories and binary variables for regional and time 
dependencies. The bank characteristics are the market value (log market value) 
and the market-to-book ratio. The dummy characteristics are consistent with the 
subsamples. The time dummy separates events that took place before 2006 and 
after 2007. The regional dummy differentiates between CDO from European 
and US banks. We include the correlation 250 days preceding the event. Another 
important dummy variable is whether the bank received a downgrade on the 
bank’s issuer rating three months prior to the event day. Literature suggests that 
the bank’s issuer downgrade is essential in terms of explaining abnormal returns 
for securitized products (Higgins et al. 2009). Our data sample suggests that 
there is no need to control for the strength of rating downgrades since most CDO 
deals were sharply downgraded. The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are 
based on White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). 
All our models outline that there is a highly significant negative impact with the 
intercept in model 1=-0.027 (t-value=-2.715). Interestingly, size characteristics 
have a positive impact. The log market size is in model 1 = 0.005 (t-
value=1.957) that supports the “too big to fail” assumption. Large banks may 
suffer less from rating announcements since the market may recognize that they 
are more capable to withstand possible losses from rating downgrades on CDO 
deals. In line with the corresponding literature, the issuer downgrade prior to the 
event is of core importance with a strong impact of -0.011 (t-value= -2.066) in 
model 1. All models indicate a suitable regression model with an adjusted r-
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squared of more than 0.1. Overall, the multivariate regression analysis supports 
the findings for the abnormal returns as identified in the event study. 
Table 2.6: Multivariate regression for CDO rating announcements 
Model 1 2 3 
Intercept -0.027 -0.032 -0.026 
t-value -2.715*** -2.762*** -2.597*** 
Bank characteristics 
   Log Market Size 0.005 0.005 0.005 
t-value 1.957* 1.999** 1.999** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.002 
t-value 1.475 1.005 0.725 
Region 
   Europe (Dummy=1) 
 
-0.003 
 t-value 
 
-1.784* 
 US (Dummy=1) 
  
0.003 
t-value 
  
0.924 
Time 
   before 2006 (Dummy=1) 
 
-0.003 
 t-value 
 
-2.016** 
 after 2007 (Dummy=1) 
  
-0.004 
t-value 
  
-1.806* 
Risk characteristics 
   Downgrade issuer rating (Dummy=1) -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
t-value -2.066** -1.840* -1.832* 
Correlation 0.020 0.001 0.002 
t-value -1.316 -1.147 -1.127 
Model parameters 
   adjusted r-squared 0.116 0.120 0.120 
F-statistics 8.770*** 5.562*** 5.570*** 
N 238 238 238 
 
2.4 Summary and conclusion 
Rating grades have become an integral part in the banking industry. We intend 
to quantify the impact of rating announcements on the bank’s share price. We 
examine rating implications from CDO and cross check the implications by 
including the bank’s issuer rating. The basic building blocks in our analysis are 
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1) rating shopping and rating grade inflation, 2) reputation of rating agencies, 3) 
sophisticated or trusting investor behavior and 4) informational asymmetry. 
Our results indicate that informational asymmetry is very distinct. Furthermore, 
the other dominating theory that we find support for is the sophisticated or 
trusting investor theorem. We observe a switch from the trusting to the 
sophisticated investor over time. 
We explain our results with the growing market impact of CDO and 
securitization in general. Rating agencies recognized that structured finance 
products like CDO became a considerable profit contributor for their business. 
Nonetheless, neither the rating agencies nor the market participants were 
cautious enough to assess the risk CDO were bearing. The assumed risk transfer 
did not hold true since the complex construction of CDO permitted feedback 
channels to the bank. Beginning with the subprime credit crisis, the high rating 
grades were questioned by the market seeing a rapid drop in confidence to 
complex products. In the wake of the financial crisis CDO were blamed to bear 
incalculable risk. However, the results highlight that risk from rating 
announcements on CDO deals is actually limited to a very narrow time frame. 
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3 Benefits from Securitization for Institutional Investors 
This study investigates investment charters and the performance of institutional 
investors in the US, UK and Germany. Investment charters for institutional 
investors are supposed to prevent high risk taking and to establish stable 
financial markets. Institutional investors are dominant market actors with 
essential market power. Exemplarily, the importance of institutional investors is 
highlighted by Campbell and Taksler (2003) who observe that about 60% of all 
US corporate bonds are held by institutional investors.6 In addition, Binay 
(2005) finds that institutional ownership in the equity market grew from 35% in 
1981 to 58% in 2002. The dominance of institutional investors is supported by a 
more recent study from Lewellen (2011). Given their influence on the financial 
market, individuals might consider institutional investors as “safe haven” 
especially during times of heightened uncertainty and economic downturns.  
According to the investment practices of institutional investors, there are two 
dominating strategies, the prudent person rule and quantitative portfolio 
restrictions. The prudent person rule suggests that decisions should be taken to 
the best of one’s knowledge and judgment whereas quantitative portfolio 
restrictions determine the maximum share of each portfolio component. 
However, both investment strategies could not fully withstand the market 
turbulences in the financial crisis. 
Institutional investors have experienced stress during the financial crisis in terms 
of generating stable returns and evading risk. Hence, they were forced to review 
their portfolio allocation strategy and to evaluate the suitability of financial 
products that were underrepresented so far. Generally, financial products qualify 
to be considered in the portfolio of institutional investors when there is a low 
                                           
6 This is composed of 15% by pension funds, 5% to 10% by mutual funds, 5% by commercial banks and one 
third by insurance firms. 
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correlation to other assets and steady return rates. In this context, we investigate 
whether an increased investment in securitization is beneficial. Early research on 
securitization from Benveniste and Berger (1987) proposed that risk mitigation 
techniques existed and moral hazard issues were offset. Securitization has 
become a success story with an impressive growth rate. According to Loutskina 
(2011), securitization accounts for approximately 40% of outstanding loans in 
the US. Loutskina and Strahan (2009) provide evidence that 60% of outstanding 
mortgage loans in the US are already securitized. More impressively, the authors 
present that the amount of securitization has already surpassed the amount of US 
corporate bonds. One aspect of the rapid market growth is related to high rating 
grades. As institutional investors are restricted to the investment grade universe 
by their charters, highly rated securitization tranches became interesting 
investment opportunities. Nonetheless, recent literature found evidence that the 
complex construction of securitizations permitted feedback channels that 
destabilized the banking system (Nijskens and Wagner (2011); Instefjord (2005) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (2010)). 
The motivation of this study is to conduct global research on investment 
practices in the US, UK and Germany covering the largest institutional 
investors. The most prominent institutional investors are life insurers, pension 
funds, mutual funds, banks, hedge funds and university endowments. We run 
portfolio optimization methodology for institutional investors where 
homogeneous portfolio allocations can be identified. The 2009 OECD survey 
discloses homogeneous portfolio compositions for life insurers, pension funds 
and open-end mutual funds. 
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The framework of this study consists of the following research questions: 
• Is the prudent person rule superior to the quantitative portfolio restriction 
approach? 
• Can small shifts in the portfolio allocation achieve higher risk-adjusted 
returns? 
• Do institutional investors possess outperformance skills? 
• Can securitization add value to the portfolio of institutional investors? 
First, we investigate whether institutional investors are exposed to the prudent 
person rule or to quantitative portfolio restrictions and whether securitization is 
permitted by the investment charters. Second, we calculate the risk-return 
characteristics of the actual portfolios and evaluate whether small shifts in the 
portfolio composition add value. Third, we examine whether securitization 
increases the risk-adjusted return of institutional investors. Lewellen (2011) 
shows that the portfolios of institutional investors replicate the value-weighted 
market index almost perfectly. Additionally, Gompers and Metrick (2001) 
highlight that institutional investors prefer large and liquid stocks that are mostly 
the components of major indices. Derived from these findings we argue that 
index-based portfolio optimization is suitable in our analysis. In addition to 
deterministic risk-return characteristics, we incorporate stochastic statistics by 
applying Monte Carlo simulations. 
Summarizing our results, we start with the descriptive findings. We observe a 
general tendency to centralized supervision of the financial services industry in 
all three countries. This pays tribute to the fact that banks, insurance firms, etc. 
offer a broad range of products and services. Furthermore, we notice a long 
history of financial regulation especially in the US and track this back to the 
aftermaths of the Great Depression with the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (Blum 1938). We discover that the prudent person 
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rule applies to institutional investors in the UK and US, whereas quantitative 
portfolio restrictions apply to German investors. We encounter a more domestic 
approach in the US and a more international approach in Europe. 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of financial regulation 
Regulation characteristics USA UK Germany 
centralized financial regulation + + + 
prudent person rule + + - 
quantitative portfolio restrictions - - + 
securitization explicitly allowed o o + 
investments in foreign markets o + + 
+ = strong impact, o = neutral, - = low impact 
 
Proceeding to the empirical results, our findings suggest that the prudent person 
rule is superior to the quantitative portfolio restriction approach. Further on, 
securitization was favorable for institutional investors prior to the financial 
crisis. As institutional investors are forced to provide stable returns at low risk, 
the deterioration of securitization was catalyzed by forced selling from 
institutional investors. When including the recent financial crisis we do not 
perceive additional value from securitization. 
We see indications of outperformance skills of institutional investors but not at 
high significance levels over all observations. Interestingly, the outperformance 
skills are most pronounced during the financial crisis meaning that institutional 
investors could be regarded as “safe haven” in times of stress. The independent 
variables in the multifactor models according to Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) reveal interesting findings. The size factor is highly significant 
with a negative sign meaning that large firms perform better than small firms in 
an extended observation period. More impressively, the momentum factor 
referring to Carhart (1997) does not deliver significant findings. 
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The remainder of section 1 presents the necessity of regulation and the lack 
thereof. We continue in section 2 with the relevant literature review, section 3 
describes the data and methodology, section 4 presents the results and section 5 
finally concludes the analysis. 
3.1 Regulation of institutional investors 
3.1.1 Necessity of investment charters and financial regulation 
In general, institutional investors are exposed to strict regulation since 
contributions made to them are mostly long term savings. We summarize the 
necessity and possible shortcomings of regulation as proposed by Davis (2001). 
• Informational asymmetry: the existence of informational asymmetry 
between purchasers of financial services and their providers makes the 
purchaser vulnerable to exploitation. This, in particular, holds true for 
securitization where the buyer may face risk from low quality assets 
(“lemons”). 
• Externalities: the reduction of government-provided pensions results in 
more contributions to private institutional investors with adequate low 
risk investments. 
• Market power: due to their high investment volume, institutional 
investors possess a distinctive market power. 
While these arguments have positive implications, the following arguments are 
negatively influenced. 
• Portfolio immunization techniques: regulation hinders the usage of 
immunization techniques for the asset-liability management. 
• Portfolio hedging: limitations in the use of derivatives force investors to 
invest in low-yield instruments to the disadvantage of clients and policy 
holders. 
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• Flexibility: strict regulation puts a burden on institutional investors who 
might not respond rapidly enough to cyclical or structural changes in the 
market. 
• Diversification: restrictions of diversification can increase overall 
portfolio risk. 
3.1.2 History of financial regulation and specifics for securitization 
The SEC as the main institution in charge of regulation in the US was 
established after the Great Depression following the 1929 financial market 
crash. With the passing of the Securities Act in 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act in 1934, both the primary and the secondary market were 
covered. Since its founding, the SEC has proposed and enacted several 
amendments in order to adapt regulation to new developments on financial 
markets. 
We observe that financial regulation is centralized in Europe as well. The 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) is in charge of financial market regulation in 
the UK with broad competence in terms of establishing market confidence, 
public awareness and the protection of consumers. The counterpart in Germany 
is the Federal Financial Services Authority (BaFin) that was formed in 2002 as a 
merger of three institutions: 
• Banking: Federal Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für 
das Kreditwesen, BAKred) 
• Insurance: Federal Insurance Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt für 
das Versicherungswesen, BAV) 
• Securities: Federal Supervisory Office for the Securities Trading 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, BAWe) 
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Securitization is a rather young investment opportunity. Nevertheless, regulation 
has extended to cover securitization as well. We outline the specifics for 
securitization exemplarily in the US not neglecting European regulation. 
Regulation of securitization is based on the Securities Exchange Act that 
prohibits trading in a security unless it has been registered with the SEC. 
Exempt from this regulation are private placements of securities. These 
securities are regarded as “restricted securities” when there is a one-year holding 
period on securities issued in a private placement. If these securities are resold in 
another private placement, longer periods apply meaning that private placements 
basically fall out of regulation by the SEC. In addition, the resale of securities to 
institutional investors is permitted without registration. 
Hence, the lack of regulation of financial products designed for institutional 
investors becomes apparent. This is valid for securitization as these are mostly 
addressed to institutional investors. Along with these shortcomings and growing 
importance of securitization, new regulation for securitization came into force. 
The full details of requirements are listed in Kothari (2006). Although there is 
plenty of information, investors need to invest time and effort to cautiously 
evaluate the quality of the securitization and its underlying reference assets 
(Downing et al. 2009). 
3.1.3 Prudent person rule or quantitative portfolio restrictions 
There is mixed evidence whether the prudent person rule or quantitative 
portfolio restrictions is superior. We account for this issue by summarizing the 
regulatory requirements. We discover that there is mostly a mix of the prudent 
person rule and quantitative restrictions. Hence, we show that institutional 
investors in the US and UK are more exposed to the prudent person rule and 
German institutional investors to quantitative portfolio restrictions. The 
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regulation is rather federal responsibility in the US, whereas German and UK 
investors are centrally regulated.7 
Table 3.2: Investment restrictions for institutional investors8 
Investor Characteristics USA UK Germany 
Li
fe
 In
su
re
rs
 
Prudent Person rule 
(PPR) 
PPR, limit of 3-5% 
other than US 
Government 
PPR, maturity 
matching 
no PPR, 
diversification rules 
apply 
Quantitative 
portfolio 
restrictions (QR) state responsibility 3% cash 
30% shares, 10% 
unquoted shares, 
25% real estate, 
50% loans, 30% 
mutual funds, 50% 
bonds 
Concentration and 
own investment n/a n/a no own investment 
Foreign Asset 
restrictions 
limit max 10%, 
state responsibility 
80% currency 
matching 
80% currency 
matching 
Pe
ns
io
n 
fu
nd
s 
Prudent Person rule 
PPR, 
diversification 
PPR, 
concentration limit 
to DC funds 
no PPR, single 
institution 2% 
Quantitative 
restrictions n/a 
10% in a single 
mutual fund, 25% 
in funds run by 
one manager 
20-25% equity, 15-
25% real estate 
Concentration and 
own investment 
own investment of 
10% for defined 
benefit funds 
own investment 
5% 
own investment 
10% 
Foreign Asset 
restrictions n/a n/a 
80% currency 
matching 
 
3.2 Literature review 
The term institutional investor is defined by Davis and Steil (2001) as 
“specialized financial institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf of 
small investors towards a specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return 
                                           
7 We do not consider the portfolio limitations for mutual funds as different types would bias a general statement. 
There are security funds, real estate funds, money market funds, funds-of-funds, etc. with different regulation. 
8 (Davis 2001), pp. 43-45 
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maximization and maturity of claims”. Institutional investors act as capital 
allocation points by aggregating large numbers of small investments from their 
clients making them potent actors on the financial market. The high investment 
volume permits institutional investors to benefit from economies of scale and to 
invest in assets that are inaccessible to private investors due to limitations like 
minimum investment or holding period. So corporate governance and 
shareholder activism as investigated by Del Guercio et al. (2008) are important 
issues for institutional investors. 
Generally, the investment strategy is characterized by investments in large and 
liquid stocks. Gompers and Metrick (2001) analyze that large institutional 
investors doubled their share in the stock market from 1980 to 1996 by investing 
preferably in large companies. Del Guercio (1996) explains the investment in 
large and liquid assets with the prudent person rule and fears of lawsuits. 
There are various observations whether the prudent person rule or quantitative 
portfolio restrictions is superior. Davis (2001) detects that the prudent person 
rule is generally superior to quantitative portfolio restrictions. Analyzing 
European life insurers, Bijapur et al. (2007) emphasize the findings. 
Investment charters stipulate that rating grades are considered as regulatory 
certifications since institutional investors are restricted to the investment grade 
universe. Bongaerts et al. (2012) find that Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
dominate the market.9 The importance of rating-based constraints is most 
pronounced at the threshold of the investment grade and non investment grade 
universe. The paper presents that Fitch Rating serves as a tiebreaker in order to 
determine whether an asset falls into the investment grade universe and thus can 
be included in the portfolio of institutional investors. This suggests that rating 
                                           
9 Rating agencies are licensed as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations by the SEC in the US. 
Similar regulation is valid in Europe, too. 
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grades are essential for marketing a product to institutional investors. In this 
context, the downgrade from the investment grade to the non investment grade 
universe may implicate forced selling and further catalyze the deterioration of 
products (Ambrose et al. 2008). Regarding securitization, Moody’s downgraded 
more than 400 deals on July 10, 2007 and Standard & Poor’s announced 612 
downgrades two days later (Higgins et al. 2009). Given these numbers, the 
question arises whether securitization can serve as a suitable investment for 
institutional investors that seek stable returns at low risk.  
Summarizing the literature with regard to the performance of institutional 
investors there are distinctive findings. Referring to Lewellen (2011), 
institutional investors have little stock-picking skills. Instead, they closely 
reproduce the market portfolio with almost perfect correlation with the value-
weighted market index. He finds a correlation of 99.8% and a beta of 1.01 in the 
observation period from 1980 to 2007. More specifically, the study presents that 
the largest institutions have the highest correlation and smallest excess returns. 
A closely related paper from Cohen et al. (2002) questions the ability of 
institutional investors to outperform the trading skills of individual investors. 
They find evidence that institutional investors outperform individuals by 1.44% 
due to their extremely conservative deviations from the market portfolio. Binay 
(2005) finds that institutional investors do possess stock-picking skills. The 
selection skills are supported by Daniel et al. (1997) who detect excess returns 
for mutual fund managers. 
Given the importance of institutional investors, we summarize their trading 
behavior. Herding and feedback trading is existing as the large investment 
volumes, especially in less liquid stocks, can influence price movements 
(Wermers 1999). Sias (2004) observes herding of institutional investors since 
the investment decisions are based on the investments of other institutional 
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investors. This is supported by the results of Nofsinger and Sias (1999) who 
analyze more herding and feedback trading for institutional investors than for 
individual investors.  
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Life insurers 
Life insurers in the US are one of the largest investors with total assets of $5 
trillion at the end of 2009 (ACLI 2010). A comparable situation can be found in 
the UK which provides the biggest insurance industry in Europe and the third 
largest in the world following the US and Japan. According to the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI), the investment volume accumulates to £560 billion in 
2009 (ABI 2010). The German Federation of Insurance Industry 
(Gesamtverband Deutscher Versicherungswirtschaft, GDV) administrates 95% 
of the German insurance market. With €700 billion assets under management in 
2009, the German life insurance industry is amongst the largest institutional 
investors in Germany (GDV 2009). 
Federal states are in charge of insurance regulation in the US. The regulation 
commissions of each state are voluntarily associated in the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC had originally advisory 
functions but expanded its competencies towards a federal agency. Each state 
has an insurance regulation department in its executive branch with “broad, 
legislatively delegated powers to enforce state insurance laws, promulgate rules 
and regulations, and conduct hearings to resolve disputed matters” (Randall 
1999). The prudent person rule shall prevent life insurers from exposure to high 
risk. 
The supervising institution in the UK is the FSA legitimated by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. The FSA is in charge of controlling and 
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regulating the financial industry. The FSA is rather liberal concerning 
quantitative portfolio restrictions. Hence, British insurers are also called “stock 
share insurances” due to their high stakes in the stock market (Bijapur et al. 
2007). In Germany, the financial stability of life insurers is set out in the 
Insurance Supervision Act (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz, VAG) and the 
investment act (Anlageverordnung, AnlV) which are supervised by the BaFin. 
The most significant tasks of the BaFin concerning life insurers are monitoring 
the financial soundness and the compliance with regulatory requirements. 
Table 3.3: Portfolio allocation of life insurers, 2009 OECD survey 
Life insurers USA UK Germany 
Currency and deposits 1.1% 6.5% 40.0% 
Securities 56.7% 52.7% 10.2% 
Loans 10.7% 2.1% 19.0% 
Shares 31.5% 38.8% 30.8% 
   Shares issued by residents 0.0% 22.4%     Shares issued by non residents 0.0% 16.4%  Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
3.3.2 Pension funds 
Life insurances and pension funds are similar concepts, although there are some 
key differences (Davis 2001). The objective of pension funds is to achieve stable 
earnings whereas life insurers have to match a nominal return in order to provide 
the guaranteed return. Furthermore, life insurers are subject to high liquidity risk 
due to early surrender values or the death of the client. There are several ways of 
categorizing pension funds: 
• By ownership: pension funds fall either under private or public regulation. 
Private pension funds traditionally play an important role in the US as 
state provided pensions are less funded than, for example, in many central 
European countries. 
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• By benefits: a defined contribution plan provides benefits solely based on 
the contributions made to the individual beneficiary’s account plus any 
investment earnings, if applicable. The amount of the annual or monthly 
contribution is predefined and usually paid by the employer. Upon 
retirement, the pension scheme works like a mutual fund trying to reach 
the best investment return possible at a given risk (Queisser 1998). Due to 
the individual accounts, funds can be transferred from one plan to another. 
In contrary, in a defined benefit plan the beneficiary receives a specific 
monthly pension based on a formula that incorporates the individual’s 
earnings history, tenure and age. Here, the issue of funding arises since 
the plan guarantees future and current benefits. In addition, transferring 
from one plan to another is more difficult since no individual funds are 
accrued.  
One of the most popular pension plans in the USA is the 401(k) plan, indicating 
the corresponding Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The 401(k) is a defined 
contribution plan that is mostly employer-sponsored and allows the participant 
to choose whether and how much to contribute, how to invest and when to 
withdraw the funds. Furthermore, participants have the option of paying taxes 
when the funds are withdrawn.10 Due to delayed taxation, pre-tax payment can 
be an attractive option for employees (Bodie (1990); Munnell and Sundén 
(2006)). In the UK pension funds are mostly structured as trusts while German 
pension funds are predominantly constituted by captive insurance companies. In 
Germany as well as in the UK the defined contribution plan is the more common 
pension scheme. This study focuses on public funds. Private funds are not 
regulated by an official institution and can differ significantly in their 
investment policies so that they are unsuitable in this analysis. 
                                           
10 usually upon retirement 
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Regulation of pension funds is fragmented with many distributed responsibilities 
(Queisser 1998). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
passed in 1974, regulates employee benefit plans in the USA. It establishes basic 
rules for pension plans, such as pension vesting (the employee attains a non-
forfeitable right to receive benefits after a certain number of years of 
participation in the plan). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 made important 
enhancements to the existing regulation in terms of disclosure and reporting 
issues (Lansberg 2008). In general, investment regulation is based on the 
prudent person rule (Queisser 1998). Pension fund trustees establish their own, 
more specific investment regulation based on this guideline. In the UK pension 
funds are subject to the prudent person rule monitored by the FSA who 
establishes principles for financial services provider. Pension funds in Germany 
are supervised by the BaFin. Additionally, the regulating institutions in the 
European Union are the International Organization of Pension Supervisors and 
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. 
A study referring to the performance of US pension funds was conducted by 
Bauer et al. (2010) on 463 defined benefit pension funds from 1990-2006 and 
248 defined contribution pension funds from 1997-2006. The authors find that 
cost levels for pension funds are substantially lower than for mutual funds, 
mainly because of economies of scale. Furthermore, they find a negative 
correlation between the size of the pension fund and its performance, as well as 
between the liquidity of investments and their performance. When comparing 
the performance of defined benefit vs. defined contribution plans, they come to 
the conclusion that defined benefit plans generally seem to accomplish better 
returns than defined contribution plans due to better performing small cap 
investments and lower cost levels. There seems to be no consensus on the 
general performance of pension funds. While the study on 6,260 portfolios of 
defined benefit pension fund accounts shows that the average fund manages to 
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outperform the market by 124 basis points (Busse et al. 2010), others find that 
pension funds lag the S&P 500 by 260 basis points annually (Lakonishok et al. 
1992). 
The UK pension funds market is the second largest to the US pension funds 
market. Pension funds in the UK have experienced a considerable growth rate 
with a continuously positive trend (Blake et al. 1997). From 2000-2009, UK 
pension funds generated an average return of 3.7% while the benchmark FTSE 
All-Share index rose by 1.2%. In the recent financial crisis it was perceived that 
UK pension funds shifted more towards secure investments like low yield bonds 
rather than equity (IMA 2008). In Germany due to lower government provided 
pensions, pension funds have attracted more attention with a constant growth 
rate (Maurer 2003). The portfolio of pension funds differs for the respective 
countries. 
Table 3.4: Portfolio allocation of pension funds, 2009 OECD survey 
Pension funds USA UK Germany 
Currency and deposits 1.2% 6.2% 44.7% 
Securities 34.3% 46.0% 9.9% 
Loans 0.9% 0.3% 8.5% 
Shares 63.6% 47.5% 37.0% 
   Shares issued by residents  20.4%  
   Shares issued by non residents  27.1%  
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
3.3.3 Mutual funds 
Given their size, mutual funds can benefit from investment opportunities that 
require significant minimum investments, achieve better trading terms or spread 
fixed costs over a large base of assets (Buti 2005). According to data provided 
by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), a national association of US 
investment companies, mutual funds serve as important investment channels in 
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the stock, bond and money markets by holding 28% of US corporate equity, 
12% of US treasury and government securities and 51% of all commercial paper 
as at the end of 2009 (ICI 2010). 
According to the SEC’s official definition, a mutual fund is an investment 
company that pools money from investors in order to invest in stocks, bonds and 
other securities. The investors purchase shares of the fund at a price relative to 
the fund’s net asset value (NAV) and any charges that may apply. These shares 
are usually not traded in a secondary market (between investors), instead they 
are redeemable meaning that they can be sold back to the fund at their current 
NAV minus redemption fees (Frankel and Cunningham 2006). 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains regulation on disclosure and the 
pricing of redeemable securities as well as the valuation of the portfolio 
holdings. Portfolio holdings for which market quotations are readily available 
have to be priced at market value, while other securities are priced at fair value 
by the fund’s board. No single standard exists for this process of fair valuation, 
but the SEC provides extensive guidance and supervision (ICI 2009). 
Furthermore, the Investment Company Act contains income tax regulation for 
investment companies. Investment companies are generally exempt from paying 
federal income tax on net income and realized gains, as long as these are 
redistributed to the shareholders. The investment objectives of a specific fund 
are stated in the fund’s prospectus, disclosing information about the fund and its 
fund managers. 
An important regulation valid for all countries is the rule that mutual funds, i.e. 
open-end funds that issue redeemable securities, must be prepared to redeem 
shares daily and repay redeeming shareholders within seven days after receiving 
a redemption request. This means a need for liquidity on the one hand and a 
need for exact calculation of the NAV on the other (ICI 2009). 
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The mutual funds industry has experienced a strong growth in the past years 
with total funds amounting to $12.2 trillion at year-end 2009 (ICI 2010). The 
performance of mutual funds is strongly correlated with the performance of the 
underlying assets. Net flows to equity funds generally tend to rise with stock 
prices. Similar to equity funds, demand and performance of fixed-income funds 
show a strong correlation with bond performance and, accordingly, the US yield 
curve. Due to the good performance of corporate bonds in 2009 and the low 
short term interest rates that provoked a shift of investor demand away from 
money market funds towards bond funds, mutual funds achieved a record net 
inflow of $376 billion in 2009. Several academic studies over an extended time 
horizon dealing with the performance of mutual funds come to the result that 
mutual funds can rarely generate an excess risk-adjusted return (Jensen (1967); 
Malkiel (1995); Gruber (1996) and Nitzsche et al. (2008)). 
Table 3.5: Portfolio allocation of mutual funds, 2009 OECD survey 
Mutual funds USA UK Germany 
Currency and deposits 6.3% 3.5% 11.0% 
Securities 43.0% 26.3% 52.4% 
Loans 6.7% 0.0% 0.2% 
Shares 44.0% 70.1% 36.4% 
   Shares issued by residents 36.6% 18.9% 
   Shares issued by non residents 33.5% 17.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
In order to consider the allocation of “other” we relocate its share to the 
remaining asset classes according to the portfolio allocation for all institutional 
investors. 
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3.3.4 Sample characterization 
For simulation purposes we conduct the data gathering by using major indices 
and weight them according to the portfolio allocation. The data source is 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. We argue that the usage of market indices is 
justified since academics found that institutional investors prefer to invest in 
large cap assets (Gompers and Metrick 2001). Historically, large cap assets have 
a strong correlation with the major index and determine its performance (Banz 
1981). Exemplarily, the S&P 500 refers to the US domestic equity position. 
We analyze portfolio performance of institutional investors and examine 
aggregated average portfolios for each institutional investor. In order to prevent 
bias from economic booms and downturns we consider a time horizon from 
06/1992-06/2011. We retrieve monthly data and upscale them to yearly risk-
return statistics. We take total return prices into account that include stock splits, 
dividend payments, etc. The following list illustrates the indices and provides 
risk and return characteristics over the time period 06/1992-06/2011. We take 
the securitization index for countries and consider denomination in local 
currency. 
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Table 3.6: Index-base positions with Datastream code 
Asset class Country Indices (Code) 
Return p.a. 
06/1992-06/2010 
Volatility p.a. 
06/1992-06/2010 
Shares 
Germany DAX 30 PERFORMANCE - DAXINDX(RI) 10.4% 21.7% 
UK FTSE 100 - FTSE100(RI) 9.2% 15.3% 
USA S&P 500 COMPOSITE - S&PCOMP(RI) 9.2% 15.6% 
Foreign MSCI WORLD U$ - MSWRLD$(RI) 8.2% 15.9% 
Securities 
Germany REX GENERAL BOND - REXINDX(RI) 6.2% 3.5% 
UK BOFA ML UK GILTS 10+Y (£) - MLUK10£(RI) 8.4% 8.6% 
USA JPM UNITED STATES GOVT.BOND US$ - JPMUSU$(RI) 6.2% 4.8% 
Loans 
Germany BOFA ML US CRP/GVT 10+Y (E) - MLGCTPE(RI) 7.8% 12.0% 
UK BOFA ML US CRP/GVT 1-10Y (£) - MLUG1T£(RI) 7.1% 9.9% 
USA BOFA ML CORP & GVT. MSTR ($) - MLCORGM(RI) 6.3% 4.4% 
Currency and 
Deposits 
Germany JPM GERMANY CASH 6M - JPBD6ML(RI) 4.1% 0.6% 
UK JPM UK CASH 6M - JPUK6ML(RI) 5.5% 0.8% 
USA JPM US CASH 6M - JPUS6ML(RI) 4.2% 0.7% 
Securitization 
Germany BOFA ML US ABS HM EQTY LOANS(E) - MLAHELE(RI) 4.7% 11.3% 
UK BOFA ML US ABS HM EQTY LOANS(£) - MLAHEL£(RI) 5.8% 10.3% 
USA BOFA ML US ABS HM EQTY LOANS($) - MLASHEL(RI) 4.6% 5.0% 
 
3.3.5 Methodology 
We apply mean-variance efficient portfolios with optimal risk and return 
characteristics. We calculate the expected return for each institutional investor 
with the actual portfolio allocation and under constraints.  
As constraints we take the portfolio allocation as derived in the data section and 
permit flexible shifts of -10% or +10% per asset. Furthermore, the minimum 
asset allocation is set equal to zero meaning that we do not consider short selling 
of portfolio positions. The maximum asset allocation is restricted to the 
maximum share as outlined in the investment charters. Our objective is to 
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determine the risk-adjusted return of the portfolio. The optimization process is 
divided as follows and presented in the output tables: 
• Optimized portfolio with actual asset allocation 
• Optimized portfolio with flexible asset allocation, no securitization 
• Optimized portfolio with flexible asset allocation, with securitization  
We maximize the risk-return statistics derived from the Sharpe Ratio that 
determines where the tangency line hits the efficient portfolio: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑝 = 𝐸�𝑟𝑝� − 𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜎𝑝  
Where E(rp) is the expected return, σp is the volatility of the portfolio and rfree is 
the risk-free return rate. E(rp) is calculated by the average of the returns ri on the 
investments in the portfolio given the portfolio weights xi. 
𝐸(𝑟𝑝) = �𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑖
𝑖
 
We first calculate the variance of the portfolio and then derive the volatility. The 
variance of the portfolio is equal to the sum of the covariances of the returns ri 
and rj of all pairs in the portfolio multiplied by the portfolio weights xi and xj. 
𝜎𝑝
2 = � � 𝑥𝑖
𝑗
𝑥𝑗  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑗)
𝑖
 
And so the volatility is: 
𝜎𝑝 = �𝜎𝑝2 
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The optimal portfolio allocation is subject to the constraints from the investment 
charters. We allow shifts in the portfolio of -10% and +10% for each asset in 
order to permit flexibility:  0 ≤ [𝑥𝑖 − 10%; 𝑥𝑖 + 10%] ≤ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
The limitation in portfolio shifts is justified since only small deviations in the 
share of each portfolio position is observed as presented in the historical 
portfolio allocation over a time period of 20 years.  
In addition to the determination of the portfolio return and volatility, we 
calculate more sophisticated risk indicators. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a 
measurement of the maximum portfolio loss at a given probability and a certain 
holding period. The VaR is an established risk measurement indicator in the 
financial industry according to Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) and Pérignon et 
al. (2008). We consider the maximum portfolio loss in a holding period of one 
year (252 trading days) with a probability of 99%. In other words, the VaR 
assumes that losses beyond the VaR occur at a probability of 1%. 
There are basically three approaches to calculate the VaR (Linsmeier and 
Pearson 2000). The historical simulation is a non-parametric approach that 
calculates the VaR from past records. It is easy to implement but has 
shortcomings since it does not assume any distribution. Pérignon and Smith 
(2010) find that it is the most popular VaR approach of commercial banks but 
with little information about future volatility. The variance-covariance approach 
assumes normal distribution whereas the Monte Carlo Simulation is a stochastic 
approach in order to estimate a VaR. It generates random numbers that are 
transformed to price changes even in case of non-linearity.  
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The VaR from the Monte Carlo Simulation describes that the periodic return on 
a continuously compounded frequency is approximately normally distributed 
and the price levels are therefore log normally distributed: 
𝑙𝑛 �
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
�  ~ ɸ ��𝜇 − 𝜎22 � ∗ 𝑇,𝜎√𝑇� 
where T is scaled from monthly to yearly numbers. We conclude that there is a 
log normal diffusion process and set up the link to the Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM) that takes a deterministic and stochastic part into account. We 
run 5000 simulations to derive the Monte Carlo VaR. 
𝑙𝑛 �
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
� = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝑡𝜎 
With α as the deterministic and zt as the stochastic part. α is calculated by the 
expected return from our observation and zt is the random shock scaled by the 
volatility. So the price change is. 
�
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
� = 𝑒𝛼+𝑧𝑡𝜎 
Additionally, we analyze the portfolio performance by calculating the 
outperformance of the portfolio in comparison to the market with commonly 
applied performance measures: 
CAPM measures the market outperformance of the portfolio and sensitivity in 
the form (Sharpe 1964): 
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1�𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓� + 𝜀 
Three factor model of Fama and French (1993) measures the outperformance 
with a size (small minus big) and value (high minus low) factor in the form: 
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𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1�𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓� + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀 
The four factor model of Carhart (1997) adds a momentum factor (winner minus 
loser) in the form:  
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1�𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓� + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿+𝛽4𝑊𝑀𝐿 + 𝜀 
The momentum factor signals the herding effect to some extent. The multi factor 
models are supposed to improve the explanatory power R2 of the CAPM. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Portfolio allocation Life insurers 
The results table for life insurers highlights that securitization has been 
beneficial prior to the financial crisis for US and UK life insurers with 10% and 
6.8%, respectively. In contrary, German life insurers could not benefit from 
securitization. Furthermore, the risk-adjusted portfolio return is higher for US 
and UK life insurers suggesting that the prudent person rule is superior to 
quantitative portfolio restrictions. Nonetheless, the prudent person rule has 
higher risk characteristics in terms of volatility and Monte Carlo VaR. 
The motivation of this study is to explain the rapid decline of securitization in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. When considering the time period 1992-
2011, there is no additional value from including securitization in the portfolio 
of life insurers. The share of securitization for US life insurers has dropped from 
10% to 0%. As US life insurers invested a significant amount in securitization, 
the forced selling is one of the reasons of the intense decline. Interestingly, the 
share of securitization for UK life insurers is still above 0% despite of the 
financial crisis. 
 
50 
 
Table 3.7: Portfolio allocation life insurers, 1992-2006 
Life insurers 1992-2006 USA UK Germany 
Asset allocation Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec 
Currency and deposits 1.1% 11.0% 10.2% 6.5% 16.5% 16.5% 40.0% 31.2% 31.2% 
Securities 56.7% 46.7% 46.7% 52.7% 58.7% 54.0% 10.2% 20.2% 20.2% 
Loans 10.7% 20.0% 11.3% 2.1% 1.5% 0.0% 19.0% 22.3% 22.3% 
Shares 31.5% 22.4% 21.9% 38.8% 23.3% 22.8% 30.8% 26.3% 26.3% 
  Shares issued by residents   
 
  22.4% 12.4% 12.4%   
    Shares issued by non residents   
 
  16.4% 10.9% 10.4%   
  Securitization     10.0%     6.8%     0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Return 7.6% 7.0% 7.0% 9.3% 8.9% 8.8% 7.5% 7.4% 7.4% 
Risk 5.1% 4.2% 4.0% 7.2% 6.1% 5.9% 7.5% 6.2% 6.2% 
VaR 8.3% 7.8% 7.7% 8.4% 8.2% 7.9% 9.9% 7.0% 7.0% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.60       0.60       0.62       0.67       0.73       0.73       0.40       0.47       0.47  
 
 
Table 3.8: Portfolio allocation life insurers, 1992-2011 
Life insurers 1992-2011 USA UK Germany 
Asset allocation Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec 
Currency and deposits 1.1% 0.2% 0.2% 6.5% 11.5% 11.5% 40.0% 35.2% 35.2% 
Securities 56.7% 59.0% 59.1% 52.7% 52.7% 52.1% 10.2% 15.2% 15.2% 
Loans 10.7% 14.3% 14.1% 2.1% 7.1% 7.1% 19.0% 23.8% 23.8% 
Shares 31.5% 26.5% 26.5% 38.8% 28.8% 28.8% 30.8% 25.8% 25.8% 
  Shares issued by residents   
 
  22.4% 17.4% 17.4% 
     Shares issued by non residents   
 
  16.4% 11.4% 11.4% 
   Securitization     0.0%     0.6%     0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Return 7.1% 7.0% 7.0% 8.3% 8.1% 8.1% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 
Risk 5.6% 5.1% 5.1% 7.7% 6.7% 6.7% 7.1% 6.4% 6.4% 
VaR 9.8% 8.9% 8.9% 9.5% 7.4% 7.4% 9.7% 8.0% 8.0% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.56       0.59       0.59       0.57       0.61       0.61       0.41       0.45       0.45  
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3.4.2 Portfolio allocation Pension funds 
As US and UK pension funds are exposed to the prudential person rule while 
German pension funds rather to quantitative portfolio restrictions, the results 
support the findings as presented for life insurers. Securitization is beneficial for 
US and UK pension funds prior to the financial crisis with 10% and 6.5%, 
respectively. When including the financial crisis, only UK pension funds can 
benefit from securitization to a little extent.  
An interesting finding is that the share of securities, primarily government 
bonds, is significantly higher when including the financial crisis. This outcome 
is intuitive since in times of stress the investor should be more risk averse with 
more investments in large and liquid assets.  
Despite having higher levels of volatility, the return statistics of US and UK 
pension compensate the higher level of risk in terms of risk-adjusted returns. 
However, due to higher volatility, the risk-adjusted returns are lower than for 
life insurers.  
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Table 3.9: Portfolio allocation pension funds, 1992-2006 
Pension funds 1992-2006 USA UK Germany 
Asset allocation Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec 
Currency and deposits 1.2% 0.1% 0.2% 6.2% 16.2% 16.2% 44.7% 35.0% 35.0% 
Securities 34.3% 35.9% 26.5% 46.0% 54.9% 49.8% 9.9% 19.9% 19.9% 
Loans 0.9% 10.4% 9.7% 0.3% 1.3% 0.0% 8.5% 18.2% 18.2% 
Shares 63.6% 53.6% 53.7% 47.5% 27.5% 27.5% 37.0% 27.0% 27.0% 
  Shares issued by residents   
 
  20.4% 10.4% 10.4% 
     Shares issued by non residents   
 
  27.1% 17.1% 17.1% 
   Securitization     10.0%     6.5%     0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Return 8.9% 8.5% 8.5% 9.3% 8.9% 8.8% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 
Risk 8.5% 7.3% 7.3% 7.6% 6.1% 5.9% 8.3% 6.7% 6.7% 
VaR 10.8% 8.5% 8.4% 8.2% 7.2% 7.2% 11.8% 8.2% 8.2% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.52       0.55       0.55       0.64       0.73       0.73       0.35       0.43       0.43  
 
 
Table 3.10: Portfolio allocation pension funds, 1992-2011 
Pension funds 1992-2011 USA UK Germany 
Asset allocation Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec 
Currency and deposits 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 6.2% 11.2% 11.0% 44.7% 39.8% 39.8% 
Securities 34.3% 36.7% 36.7% 46.0% 46.0% 46.0% 9.9% 14.9% 14.9% 
Loans 0.9% 4.5% 4.5% 0.3% 5.3% 5.3% 8.5% 13.4% 13.4% 
Shares 63.6% 58.6% 58.6% 47.5% 37.5% 37.5% 37.0% 32.0% 32.0% 
  Shares issued by residents   
 
  20.4% 15.4% 15.4% 
     Shares issued by non residents   
 
  27.1% 22.1% 22.1% 
   Securitization     0.0%     0.3%     0.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Return 8.1% 8.0% 8.0% 8.3% 8.1% 8.1% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 
Risk 9.8% 9.1% 9.1% 8.3% 7.1% 7.1% 8.1% 7.1% 7.1% 
VaR 14.8% 13.2% 13.2% 11.0% 8.5% 8.5% 11.8% 9.7% 9.7% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.42       0.44       0.44       0.52       0.58       0.58       0.36       0.41       0.41  
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3.4.3 Portfolio allocation Mutual funds 
Due to the great variety of mutual funds, the classification into prudent person 
rule or quantitative portfolio restrictions does not apply in this analysis. The 
findings for life insurers and pension funds are supported in the sense that US 
mutual funds could benefit from securitization prior to the financial crisis. Here, 
German mutual funds benefit from securitization both prior to the financial 
crisis and over the time period 1992-2011. 
Putting together, the strong decline of securitization in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis is caused by the forced selling of institutional investors, primarily 
from US and UK. Institutional investors consider long term stable assets as 
preferred investments. The strong decline of securitization in the wake of the 
financial crisis resulted in volatile performance and expulsion from the portfolio 
of institutional investors. 
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Table 3.11: Portfolio allocation mutual funds, 1992-2006 
Mutual funds 1992-2006 USA UK Germany 
Asset allocation Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec 
Currency and deposits 6.3% 1.2% 1.0% 3.5% 13.5% 13.5% 11.0% 20.6% 20.1% 
Securities 43.0% 48.1% 38.3% 26.3% 35.9% 35.8% 52.4% 62.4% 62.4% 
Loans 6.7% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 
Shares 44.0% 34.0% 34.0% 70.1% 50.2%   36.4% 16.4% 16.4% 
  Shares issued by residents   
 
  36.6% 26.7% 26.6% 18.9% 8.9% 8.9% 
  Shares issued by non residents   
 
  33.5% 23.5% 23.5% 17.4% 7.4% 7.4% 
Securitization     10.0%     0.6%     0.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Return 8.0% 7.7% 7.7% 9.6% 9.2% 9.1% 7.7% 6.8% 6.8% 
Risk 6.2% 5.3% 5.2% 9.6% 7.5% 7.5% 6.0% 3.3% 3.3% 
VaR 11.9% 11.7% 11.4% 12.7% 10.3% 10.3% 11.3% 10.9% 10.9% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.55       0.58       0.59       0.52       0.61       0.61       0.51       0.66       0.66  
 
 
Table 3.12: Portfolio allocation mutual funds, 1992-2011 
Mutual funds 1992-2011 USA UK Germany 
Asset allocation Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec Actual 
Opt. 
w/o sec 
Opt. w/ 
sec 
Currency and deposits 6.3% 1.5% 1.8% 3.5% 3.6% 3.6% 11.0% 11.3% 10.5% 
Securities 43.0% 47.9% 48.0% 26.3% 31.3% 31.3% 52.4% 57.4% 57.4% 
Loans 6.7% 11.5% 11.2% 0.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.2% 4.8% 4.9% 
Shares 44.0% 39.1% 39.1% 70.1% 60.1% 60.1% 36.4% 26.4% 26.5% 
  Shares issued by residents   
 
  36.6% 31.6% 31.6% 18.9% 14.0% 13.9% 
  Shares issued by non residents   
 
  33.5% 28.5% 28.5% 17.4% 12.5% 12.6% 
Securitization     0.0%     0.0%     0.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Return 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 8.5% 8.4% 8.4% 7.1% 6.8% 6.9% 
Risk 7.0% 6.4% 6.4% 10.8% 9.5% 9.5% 6.3% 4.8% 4.8% 
VaR 14.9% 13.6% 12.6% 16.5% 13.7% 13.7% 12.6% 11.3% 11.3% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.49       0.52       0.52       0.42       0.47       0.47       0.49       0.59       0.59  
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3.4.4 Portfolio performance of life insurers 
We investigate the outperformance skills of life insurers and differentiate 
between pre crisis, crisis and a post crisis period. Literature suggests mixed 
evidence that institutional investors are capable of outperforming the market. 
More concretely, it is of interest whether institutional investors are capable of 
outperforming the market in times as stress so that the “safe haven” assumption 
is emphasized. Applying CAPM and the multi-factor models of Fama French 
and Carhart, we detect that US life insurers outperform the market with a 
significant alpha. As presented, US life insurers could improve their risk-
adjusted return prior to the financial crisis with securitization. Since the share of 
securitization vanished after the outbreak of the financial crisis, US and UK life 
insurers are still capable of achieving an alpha in relation to the market. This 
means that the immediate shift in the portfolio allocation is essential in order to 
achieve outperformance returns. We do not discover significant outperformance 
skills for German life insurers. 
Furthermore, the results show that the multi factor models have higher 
explanatory power than the CAPM. Interesting is the fact that the size factor in 
the multi factor model is significantly negative. This emphasizes that in volatile 
markets institutional investors prefer investments in larger firms. The 
momentum effect does not deliver significant findings implying that there comes 
no benefit from herding and feedback trading. 
Summarizing the results for life insurers, the prudent person rule delivers higher 
risk-adjusted returns than the quantitative portfolio restriction approach. Life 
insurers show indications of outperformance skills but not at high significance 
levels. 
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Table 3.13: Portfolio performance life insurers, pre crisis 
Life insurances, 1992-2006 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.01%** 3.38% 
 
3.15%** 4.00% 
 
1.44% 37.5% 
Rm-Rf 0.26 *** 0.00% 
 
0.29*** 0.00% 
 
0.29*** 0.0% 
R2 48.9% 
  
52.7% 
  
50.3% 
 
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.17%** 2.12% 
 
4.02%*** 0.96% 
 
2.50% 12.98% 
Rm-Rf 0.27*** 0.00% 
 
0.25*** 0.00% 
 
0.25*** 0.0% 
SMB -0.10*** 0.01% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.01% 
HML -0.01 72.6% 
 
-0.06 20.9% 
 
-0.08 11.9% 
R2 53.4% 
  
58.8% 
  
65.6% 
 
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.94%** 4.37% 
 
4.03%** 1.39% 
 
3.32%* 5.55% 
Rm-Rf 0.27*** 0.00% 
 
0.25*** 0.00% 
 
0.24*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.10*** 0.00% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
 
-0.21*** 0.03% 
HML 0.00 84.8% 
 
-0.06 21.4% 
 
-0.10* 7.5% 
WML 0.02 24.4% 
 
0.00 98.2% 
 
-0.05 13.1% 
R2 53.5% 
  
58.5% 
  
66.1% 
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Table 3.14: Portfolio performance life insurers, crisis 
Life insurances, 1992-2008 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.23%** 1.45% 
 
2.93%** 4.42% 
 
1.43% 35.3% 
Rm-Rf 0.25*** 0.00% 
 
0.28*** 0.00% 
 
0.28*** 0.0% 
R2 49.5%     51.6%     49.8%   
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.34%*** 0.96% 
 
3.60%** 1.40% 
 
2.23% 15.05% 
Rm-Rf 0.27*** 0.00% 
 
0.25*** 0.00% 
 
0.25*** 0.0% 
SMB -0.09*** 0.02% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
 
-0.21*** 0.01% 
HML -0.01 80.9% 
 
-0.06 22.3% 
 
-0.08 14.6% 
R2 62.7%     68.0%     65.1%   
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.32%** 1.23% 
 
3.64%** 1.91% 
 
3.12%* 5.74% 
Rm-Rf 0.27*** 0.00% 
 
0.25*** 0.00% 
 
0.24*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.09*** 0.03% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
 
-0.20*** 0.02% 
HML -0.01 82.6% 
 
-0.06 22.6% 
 
-0.09* 8.8% 
WML 0.00 92.4% 
 
0.00 93.6% 
 
-0.05 10.1% 
R2 62.5%     67.6%     65.7%   
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Table 3.15: Portfolio performance life insurers, post crisis 
Life insurances, 1992-2011 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.17%** 1.38% 
 
3.22%** 1.86% 
 
2.12% 12.2% 
Rm-Rf 0.27*** 0.00% 
 
0.28*** 0.00% 
 
0.23*** 0.0% 
R2 52.6% 
  
49.7% 
  
49.9% 
 
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.28%*** 0.81% 
 
3.50%*** 0.91% 
 
2.05% 3.51% 
Rm-Rf 0.28*** 0.00% 
 
0.27*** 0.00% 
 
0.22*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.10*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
HML 0.00 82.7% 
 
-0.03 51.2% 
 
-0.09 3.4% 
R2 56.1% 
  
54.6% 
  
56.9% 
 
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
 
Coef. p-value 
Intercept 2.23%** 1.07% 
 
3.74%*** 0.80% 
 
2.08%*** 0.62% 
Rm-Rf 0.28*** 0.00% 
 
0.26*** 0.00% 
 
0.20*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.10*** 0.01% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
HML 0.01 77.4% 
 
-0.04 44.3% 
 
-0.12*** 0.9% 
WML 0.01 71.4% 
 
-0.02 56.8% 
 
-0.06** 1.8% 
R2 55.9% 
  
54.4% 
  
58.2% 
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3.4.5 Portfolio performance of pension funds 
The outperformance skills of UK pension funds are in all three performance 
measures statistically significant. In contrary, there are signs of outperformance 
skills for US and German pension funds but not at high significance levels. In 
line with the findings for life insurers, the size factor in the multifactor models is 
significant with a negative sign whereas the growth and momentum factors are 
insignificant.  
Putting together, there is more evidence of outperformance skills for life insurers 
than for pension funds. Especially in the time period 1992-2008, the intercept of 
life insurers is higher than for pension funds. 
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Table 3.16: Portfolio performance pension funds, pre crisis 
Pension funds, 1992-2006 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.27% 19.7% 
 
2.60%* 7.1% 
 
0.71% 66.2% 
Rm-Rf 0.55*** 0.00% 
 
0.36*** 0.00% 
 
0.37*** 0.00% 
R2 69.9% 
  
66.4% 
  
61.8% 
 
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.71%* 6.9% 
 
3.58%** 1.3% 
 
1.89% 25.5% 
Rm-Rf 0.55*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
 
0.34*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.14*** 0.00% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.01% 
HML -0.03 19.1% 
 
-0.07 11.4% 
 
-0.10* 7.7% 
R2 73.1% 
  
72.2% 
  
66.3% 
 
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.86%* 5.4% 
 
3.71%** 1.5% 
 
2.97%* 8.8% 
Rm-Rf 0.55*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
 
0.33*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.13*** 0.00% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
 
-0.20*** 0.03% 
HML -0.03 16.4% 
 
-0.08 11.0% 
 
-0.11* 3.9% 
WML -0.01 45.3% 
 
-0.01 78.1% 
 
-0.07* 5.0% 
R2 73.0%     72.0%     67.2%   
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Table 3.17: Portfolio performance pension funds, crisis 
Pension funds, 1992-2008 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.25% 18.9% 
 
2.40%* 7.9% 
 
0.82% 59.8% 
Rm-Rf 0.54*** 0.00% 
 
0.35*** 0.00% 
 
0.37*** 0.00% 
R2 59.1%     55.6%     51.8%   
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.57%* 8.2% 
 
3.15%** 2.0% 
 
1.74% 26.7% 
Rm-Rf 0.55*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
 
0.33*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.14*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.01% 
HML -0.03 19.9% 
 
-0.07 12.8% 
 
-0.09* 9.4% 
R2 72.5%     71.7%     66.3%   
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.75%* 5.8% 
 
3.32%** 2.2% 
 
2.88%* 8.1% 
Rm-Rf 0.55*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.13*** 0.00% 
 
-0.22*** 0.00% 
 
-0.20*** 0.02% 
HML -0.03 16.3% 
 
-0.07 12.0% 
 
-0.11** 4.5% 
WML -0.01 37.7% 
 
-0.01 73.0% 
 
-0.07** 3.7% 
R2 72.4%     71.4%     67.2%   
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Table 3.18: Portfolio performance pension funds, post crisis 
Pension funds, 1992-2011 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.00% 33.3% 
 
2.65%** 4.0% 
 
1.50% 28.0% 
Rm-Rf 0.57*** 0.00% 
 
0.36*** 0.00% 
 
0.31*** 0.00% 
R2 58.8%     54.5%     53.2%   
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.12% 26.5% 
 
2.96%** 1.8% 
 
2.25%* 9.5% 
Rm-Rf 0.60*** 0.00% 
 
0.34*** 0.00% 
 
0.30*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.12*** 0.00% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
 
-0.24*** 0.00% 
HML 0.01 67.8% 
 
-0.03 41.3% 
 
-0.10** 2.3% 
R2 70.7%     69.0%     69.4%   
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.36% 18.1% 
 
3.30%** 1.2% 
 
2.06%** 1.6% 
Rm-Rf 0.59*** 0.00% 
 
0.34*** 0.00% 
 
0.28*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.11*** 0.01% 
 
-0.23*** 0.00% 
 
-0.24*** 0.00% 
HML 0.00 90.6% 
 
-0.04 32.2% 
 
-0.13*** 0.5% 
WML -0.02 14.8% 
 
-0.02 39.4% 
 
-0.07*** 0.8% 
R2 70.8%     68.9%     70.7%   
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3.4.6 Portfolio performance of mutual funds 
Academic studies have research the outperformance skills of mutual fund 
managers (Jensen (1967); Malkiel (1995); Gruber (1996) and Nitzsche et al. 
(2008)). Our results are in line with the findings of the relevant research that 
indications of outperformance skills are present but not highly significant. 
Nonetheless, we discover that US mutual funds have the highest outperformance 
skills since test statistics are significant in all three observations. Vice versa, UK 
mutual funds show the lowest outperformance test statistics. 
The assumption in the multi factor models that small firms perform better than 
big firms is not supported in our analysis. The size coefficient is negative for all 
institutional investors and in line with the results for life insurers and pension 
funds. The growth and momentum effect are of no significance in our analysis. 
Summarizing the performance of institutional investor, there is to some extent 
support for the “safe haven” theory of institutional investors in times of stress. 
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Table 3.19: Portfolio performance mutual funds, pre crisis 
Mutual funds, 1992-2006 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.62%* 6.62% 
 
1.58% 31.6% 
 
1.35% 18.0% 
Rm-Rf 0.37*** 0.00% 
 
0.51*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
R2 69.7%     59.5%     58.7%   
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.89%** 2.73% 
 
2.94%* 5.6% 
 
2.18%** 2.8% 
Rm-Rf 0.38*** 0.00% 
 
0.47*** 0.00% 
 
0.29*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.11*** 0.00% 
 
-0.30*** 0.00% 
 
-0.17*** 0.00% 
HML -0.02 40.8% 
 
-0.11** 3.6% 
 
-0.07** 4.3% 
R2 73.6%     66.0%     64.3%   
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.84%** 3.62% 
 
3.32%** 4.05% 
 
2.73%*** 0.88% 
Rm-Rf 0.38*** 0.00% 
 
0.46*** 0.00% 
 
0.29*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.11*** 0.00% 
 
-0.29*** 0.00% 
 
-0.17*** 0.00% 
HML -0.02 43.6% 
 
-0.11** 2.9% 
 
-0.07** 2.3% 
WML 0.00 77.4% 
 
-0.02 45.2% 
 
-0.03 8.9% 
R2 73.5%     65.9%     64.6%   
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Table 3.20: Portfolio performance mutual funds, crisis 
Mutual funds, 1992-2008 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.64%* 5.30% 
 
1.40% 35.3% 
 
1.30% 17.6% 
Rm-Rf 0.37*** 0.00% 
 
0.51*** 0.00% 
 
0.32*** 0.00% 
R2 68.8%     59.1%     58.0%   
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.85% 2.27% 
 
2.42%* 9.5% 
 
1.95%** 3.7% 
Rm-Rf 0.38*** 0.00% 
 
0.46*** 0.00% 
 
0.29*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.11*** 0.00% 
 
-0.29*** 0.00% 
 
-0.17*** 0.00% 
HML -0.02 34.9% 
 
-0.10* 5.1% 
 
-0.06* 5.1% 
R2 73.0%     65.7%     63.9%   
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.83%** 2.91% 
 
2.84%* 6.53% 
 
2.55%*** 0.99% 
Rm-Rf 0.38*** 0.00% 
 
0.46*** 0.00% 
 
0.28*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.11*** 0.00% 
 
-0.29*** 0.00% 
 
-0.17*** 0.00% 
HML -0.02 36.7% 
 
-0.10** 4.0% 
 
-0.07** 2.5% 
WML 0.00 87.9% 
 
-0.02 41.2% 
 
-0.04** 6.5% 
R2 72.8%     65.6%     64.3%   
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Table 3.21: Portfolio performance mutual funds, post crisis 
Mutual funds, 1992-2011 
CAPM 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.59%* 6.66% 
 
1.71% 22.7% 
 
1.82%** 4.3% 
Rm-Rf 0.39*** 0.00% 
 
0.51*** 0.00% 
 
0.29*** 0.00% 
R2 65.9%     67.2%     61.3%   
         Fama French 3 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.70%** 4.33% 
 
2.15% 11.0% 
 
2.31%*** 0.6% 
Rm-Rf 0.41*** 0.00% 
 
0.50*** 0.00% 
 
0.28*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.10*** 0.00% 
 
-0.29*** 0.00% 
 
-0.19*** 0.00% 
HML 0.01 73.9% 
 
-0.05 25.4% 
 
-0.07** 2.1% 
R2 73.5%     71.8%     67.4%   
         Carhart 4 Factor Model 
 
USA 
 
UK 
 
Germany 
  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept 1.78%** 3.70% 
 
2.75%* 5.12% 
 
2.90%*** 0.06% 
Rm-Rf 0.40*** 0.00% 
 
0.49*** 0.00% 
 
0.27*** 0.00% 
SMB -0.10*** 0.00% 
 
-0.29*** 0.00% 
 
-0.19*** 0.00% 
HML 0.00 83.4% 
 
-0.07 15.2% 
 
-0.08*** 0.4% 
WML -0.01 55.6% 
 
-0.04 16.0% 
 
-0.05*** 0.8% 
R2 73.4%     71.9%     68.3%   
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This research study investigates the performance of institutional investors. We 
first research the historical background of financial regulation and the 
investment charters of institutional investors. Investment charters are mandatory 
guidelines for large institutional investors with the objective to minimize risk. 
To this end, there is a tendency towards the prudent person rule for US and UK 
institutional investors and a quantitative portfolio restriction approach for 
German institutional investors. The results exhibit that the prudent person rule is 
superior to the quantitative portfolio restriction approach in terms of risk-
adjusted returns. 
In general, financial assets with a persisting and stable return profile serve as 
suitable investments for institutional investors. The decline of securitization 
during the financial crisis revealed that these do not optimize the portfolio 
structure of large institutional investors. This explains that the performance of 
securitization declined since institutional investors were forced to sell in order to 
achieve the targeted returns for their clients. The outperformance skills of 
institutional investors are a widely addressed research issue. We detect 
indications of outperformance skills but with no highly significant statistical 
evidence. 
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4 Valuation of Callable Bonds in the Financial Crisis11 
The appropriateness of valuation models to price financial products is of high 
importance specifically in the presence of complex products and rather illiquid 
capital markets. Especially stress conditions put a severe challenge to the 
effectiveness of models. We enhance research by investigating the 
appropriateness of valuation models to determine the option premium in callable 
bonds. 
Callable bonds recently experienced an increase in issuance. In the time period 
from 2005 to 2010, 9.5% of all issued corporate bonds in Germany possessed a 
call option.12 The numbers for the US corporate bond market are even more 
striking with 58.8% possessing a call option in the same time period. This ratio 
even increased during the financial crisis. The numbers of callable bonds rose to 
11.1% for German corporate bonds and 71.7% for US corporate bonds in the 
time period from July 2007 to March 2010. 
We question the model-conform valuation of callable bonds and the 
circumstances where the early termination is more likely. A sign of growing 
uncertainty is related to the term structure of interest rates and thus makes the 
modeling of the term structure more challenging under stress. As investors and 
issuers are concerned about the term structure, flexibility becomes a key asset. 
Callable bonds permit the issuer to terminate a bond earlier than maturity at 
predefined call dates. In order to compensate the investor for the possible early 
redemption, an option premium is paid that stands for the price difference of the 
callable bond and the non-callable bond. By exercising the option, an issuer can 
- given a favorable market condition - terminate the bond and refinance at better 
                                           
11 I am grateful to Niko Hatziiosifidis for his contributions to this section when conducting the Bachelor Thesis 
“Bewertung kündbarer Anleihen – Eine empirische Untersuchung am deutschen Rentenmarkt“ at the chair of 
Corporate Finance under my supervision. 
12 The aggregate number stands for bonds with a single-call or multi-call option. Numbers are taken from 
Thomson One Banker. 
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conditions. The timing of the termination is of interest in our analysis. We 
analyze callable bonds in a case study approach due to the constraints callable 
bonds are exposed to. We run the analysis applying the option premium pricing 
for single-callable bonds according to Black (1976) and for multi-callable bonds 
according to Ho and Lee (1986) and Bühler and Schulze (1993). For the 
determination of the discount function we use the spline approach of McCulloch 
(1971) and the extension in McCulloch (1975). 
In general, the pricing of financial assets is of key importance in accounting and 
financial regulation. The mark-to-market approach is suitable in liquid markets 
where the fair value is equal to the market quote. It becomes more challenging 
to price financial assets in case of complex products and in less liquid markets. 
Complex products rely on specific assumptions that rather prevail in normal 
market conditions. These assumptions permit a pricing in a mark-to-model 
approach. During the financial crisis the pricing of complex assets was a 
concern for financial institutions and supervisory authorities. Persisting 
deviations from previous market prices can result in impairments on these assets 
that may affect the profit and loss accounts and finally the equity basis. The 
financial crisis revealed that a strong activity in complex assets could result in 
sizeable impairments and finally to an increase of systemic risk. In light of these 
concerns, regulators issued new legislation referring to fair value accounting in 
illiquid markets. Products, for instance illiquid structured finance products, were 
classified as Level 3 assets. The impairments on these Level 3 assets were given 
high priority in terms of cautious accounting rules. So, regulatory foresight may 
become necessary in order to prevent a systemic shock. 
We examine the pricing of callable bonds as the determination of the embedded 
option under stress has not been research to the best of our knowledge. Acharya 
and Carpenter (2002) emphasize the complexity of embedded options in callable 
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bonds. Our findings highlight that the pricing of the fair option premium in 
callable bonds is challenging under stress since models signal prices that are not 
in line with the option premium in market quotes. Prior to the financial crisis, we 
do not detect significant deviations from the valuation model. This perception is 
challenged in the wake of the financial crisis. Surprisingly, the deviation of 
market quotes from the valuation model is not related to the bank failure of 
Lehman Brothers that ignited a contagion effect on the banking industry. We 
find, however, evidence that the government bailout is the driver of the 
mismatch between model-conform valuation and market quotes. We document a 
persisting deviation of the model-based option premium over a period of one 
year. Intuition suggests that deviations from model-conform valuation is more 
likely in times of stress. Additionally, we show that exercising the call option is 
more likely when the yield of the multi-callable bond is above the covered 
bonds yield curve. 
4.1 Literature review 
Academic research focuses on valuation principles preferably for equity where 
accounting and non-accounting figures serve as determinants to explain equity 
prices (Collins et al. (1997), Francis and Schipper (1999), Aggarwal et al. 
(2009), Balachandran and Mohanram (2011), and Zhang (2000)). In times of 
hypes and stress there is broad research about equity pricing (Core et al. (2003), 
Aharon et al. (2010), Kothari and Shanken (2003), Gavious and Schwartz 
(2011), Demers and Lev (2001) and Perkins and Perkins (1999). 
However, academic studies referring to the option pricing in callable bonds are 
underrepresented. The option premium in a callable bond can be understood as a 
contingent claim in addition to a straight bond. The mispricing of contingent 
claims is analyzed by Longstaff et al. (2001) and Ibáñez and Paraskevopoulos 
(2010). Contingent claims in the context of callable bonds have been 
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investigated by Acharya and Carpenter (2002) in a stochastic interest rates 
environment. Nonetheless, we discover that valuing contingent claims under 
stress is underrepresented in the relevant literature. 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Dataset for Single-callable bonds 
Due to the complexity of callable bonds and the specific requirements, we will 
process with a case study analysis of a single issuer. Especially bank bailouts 
would bias our findings if we had considered a broader sample. We found that 
callable bonds from Eurohypo, at that time a subsidiary of Commerzbank, fulfill 
the following constraints. At first, a homogenous market segment is needed 
where callable bonds are regular investments. Historically, the banking sector is 
a regular issuer of callable bonds. Other factors such as default risk, market 
liquidity, agency costs and taxation should have similar characteristics. There 
have to be sufficient prices of callable and non-callable bonds during the 
observation period. The option premium should only depend on the forward 
interest rate. 
4.2.2 Dataset for Multi-callable bonds 
Our data sample includes callable and non-callable bonds from Eurohypo in the 
observation period from January 2004 to September 2009 in order to include a 
pre-crisis and post-crisis period. The final sample consists of multi-callable 
bonds with 349 price observations. The face value is 100 Euro for all bonds and 
the notice period is between 1 and 10 bank days. The termination is only 
possible at one specific day for each call date. 
4.3 Methodology 
The analysis is processed as follows differentiating between single-callable and 
multi-callable bonds. 
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• Estimation of the discount functions at the beginning and the middle of 
each month from January 2005 to September 2010 for smooth discount 
functions. 
• Single-callable bonds: estimation of the option premium with the model 
of Black (1976). 
• Multi-callable bonds: estimation of the term structure movement 
according to the model of Ho and Lee (1986) and Bühler and Schulze 
(1993) and recursive evaluation of the option premium. 
4.3.1 Discount function 
The discount function is “the most fundamental curve describing the term 
structure of interest rates, the one from which all others must be derived” 
(McCulloch 1971). It describes the present value of 1 repayable in m years. In 
order to estimate the discount function, the following requirements have to be 
fulfilled: 
• The present value at time 0 is unity 
• The discount function is monotonically decreasing from 1 (=unity) 
• There are only positive values 
• The discount function is continuously differentiable 
The estimation of the discount function is a long discussed research field. 
Practitioners use parametric and non-parametric approaches. Since all 
approaches are exposed to certain requirements and no approach is best under all 
circumstances, we select the non-parametric spline approach of McCulloch 
(1971). This decision is based on our given conditions with differing maturities 
and the number of bonds. 
The approach of McCulloch (1971) infers a discount function from observed 
bond prices in the form: 
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𝑃(𝑇) = 𝑎0 + � 𝑎𝑗𝑓𝑗(𝑇)𝑘
𝑗=1
 
Based on the requirement that at point 0 the discount function is unity we 
conclude that 𝑎0 = 1 and 𝑓𝑗(0) = 0. 
𝑃(𝑇) = 1 + �𝑎𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑓𝑗(𝑇) 
Further on, the price of a bond with maturity T and coupon rate c is determined 
by the face value multiplied by the discount function at time 𝑇0 and added by the 
accrued interests. 
𝑝 = 100𝑃(𝑇0) + 𝑐 � 𝑃(𝑇)𝑑𝑇𝑇0
0
 
After rearranging the formula, we can estimate an ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression in the form: 
𝑃�(𝑇) = 1 + �𝑎�𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑓𝑗(𝑇) 
McCulloch (1975) extended the methodology for calculating 𝑓𝑗(𝑇) with cubic 
splines that has an improved explanatory power of the discount function. Given 
the discount functions, we get the yield curve 𝑟(𝑇) for maturity T. 
𝑟(𝑇) = − 1
𝑇
ln (𝑃(𝑇)) 
This can be understood as the internal rate of return of a zero-coupon bond with 
maturity T and permits a clear relation of the interest rate 𝑟(𝑇) and the discount 
function 𝑃(𝑇).  
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Figure 4.1: Discount function, 3 D plot 
 
 
4.3.2 Methodology single-callable bonds 
The model of Black (1976) is an extension of the option pricing model of Black 
and Scholes (1973). It allows the assessment of European options that are 
options with a single call date. 
The model assumes the following model environment: 
• The future bond price follows a Brownian bridge. 
• Call date of an European option is at maturity. 
• No transaction costs or taxes are in place. 
• No risk-free arbitrage is possible. 
Given the assumptions, the valuation model is presented by: 
𝑐 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑇 ∗ �𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2)� 
𝑝 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑇 ∗ �𝐾 ∗ 𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝑁(−𝑑1)� 
With 
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𝑑1 = ln�𝐹𝑇 𝐾� � + �𝑟 +  𝜎𝐹2 2� � ∗ 𝑇
𝜎𝐹√𝑇
 
𝑑2 = ln�𝐹𝑇 𝐾� � + �𝑟 −  𝜎𝐹2 2� � ∗ 𝑇
𝜎𝐹√𝑇
= 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐹√𝑇 
The variables c and p stand for the call and put prices and 𝑒−𝑟𝑇 is the discount 
with maturity T and interest rate r. The future price at time 0 with maturity T is 
presented by 𝐹𝑇 and volatility 𝜎𝐹. The strike price is K and 𝑁(𝑥) stands for the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution function 
Φ(0,1) that is less than or equal to x. 
• The payoff of a European call option with strike price K and future spot 
price BT at maturity is: max (𝐵𝑇 − 𝐾; 0) 
• The payoff of a European call option with the same strike price K und 
future price FT at maturity is: max (𝐹𝑇 − 𝐾; 0) 
• With decreasing maturity, spot price and future price converge. If spot 
price and future price possess the same maturity, then is FT=ST. 
Hence, the model of Black (1976) permits the valuation of the future spot price 
for any asset. Applying this to the Black and Scholes (1973) model, we get the 
equations: 
𝑐 = 𝑃(0,𝑇) ∗ �𝐹𝐵 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2)� 
𝑝 = 𝑃(0,𝑇) ∗ �𝐾 ∗ 𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝐹𝐵 ∗ 𝑁(−𝑑1)� 
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with:  
𝑑1 = ln�𝐹𝐵 𝐾� �  +  𝜎𝐵2 2� ∗ 𝑇
𝜎𝐵√𝑇
 
𝑑2 = ln�𝐹𝐵 𝐾� �  −   𝜎𝐵2 2� ∗ 𝑇
𝜎𝐵√𝑇
= 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐵√𝑇 
Where 𝑃(0,𝑇) stands for the discount factor with maturity T and  𝜎𝐵2 is the 
variance of the forward price. 
4.3.3 Methodology multi-callable bonds 
4.3.3.1 Term structure movement in a two-state environment 
We determine the term structure with the model of Ho and Lee (1986) using the 
binomial lattice approach. The following assumptions referring to the term 
structure movements are valid in a perfect capital market within a discrete state-
time framework: 
• There is a frictionless market with no taxes or transaction costs and all 
securities are divisible. 
• Discrete points in time exist where every period can be expressed as a 
time unit. 
• Discount bonds exist for each maturity so that the bond market is 
complete. 
• For every point in time there is a limited amount of states i. The discount 
function 𝑃𝑖=𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑛=𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 describes the term structure of interest rates of state 
i and time n. 
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As the discount function needs to be positive and has the value 1 at time 0 and 0 
at the distant future, we get: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑛(0) = 1 and lim𝑇→∞ 𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇) = 0 , for all i, n 
We extend the discount function with dynamic term structure movements. By 
convention, the discount function at initiation has state 0 and is 𝑃00(∗). As the 
model of Ho and Lee (1986) considers two states, we get at time 1 either 𝑃01(∗) 
or 𝑃11(∗). We define 𝑃11(∗) as an upstate, while 𝑃01(∗) is defined as a downstate. 
When there is an upstate at time 1, we get 𝑃22(∗) for an upstate at time 2 and 
𝑃1
2(∗) for a downstate, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the term 
structure is path-independent. This means that an upstate followed by a 
downstate is equal to a downstate followed by an upstate. The general form 
𝑃𝑖
𝑛(*) describes the discount function at time n for the interval [n; n+1] with i 
upstate and n-i downstate movements. 
                                                                      𝑃𝑖+1𝑛+1(∗) Upstate 
                                   𝑃𝑖𝑛(∗) 
                                                                      𝑃𝑖𝑛+1(∗) Downstate 
 
Given the discount function 𝑃(T), we can derive the yield curve as a function of 
the term structure movement. 
𝑟(𝑇) = − 1
𝑇
ln (𝑃(𝑇)) 
The model suggests that we have great certainty at two extreme points. Certainty 
is great at the immediate future and at the distant future. Apart from this, 
uncertainty about the term structure is great. We introduce the perturbation 
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function for the term structure movement in order to obtain an arbitrage-free 
environment. 
4.3.3.2 Perturbation functions h(T) and h*(T) 
The discount function at the n-th period and state i is expressed as 𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇). In 
case there is no interest rate risk, the term structure has to be equal for an upstate 
and downstate and becomes the implied forward interest rate in an arbitrage-free 
environment. 
 𝐹𝑖𝑛(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑖𝑛+1(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑖+1𝑛+1(𝑇) =   𝑃𝑖𝑛(T + 1)  𝑃𝑖𝑛(1)  
When the discount function deviates from the implied forward function, we need 
to quantify the perturbation. We separate this with a perturbation for both the 
upstate ℎ(𝑇) and the downstate ℎ∗(𝑇). 
                                               𝑃𝑖+1𝑛+1(T) =  𝑃𝑖𝑛(T+1)  𝑃𝑖𝑛(1)  ℎ(𝑇)          Upstate (U) 
             𝑃𝑖𝑛(T)                                     
                                               𝑃𝑖𝑛+1(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑖𝑛(T+1)  𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) ℎ∗(𝑇)         Downstate (D) 
 
Based on the requirements for the discount function, the perturbation function is 
expressed as 1 for the immediate future. 
ℎ(0) = ℎ∗(0) = 1 
All we need in order to estimate the term structure is the initial discount function 
𝑃(𝑇) and the perturbation function that can be defined as an implied binomial 
probability 𝜋 in the form: 
𝜋 ℎ(𝑇) + (1 − 𝜋)ℎ∗(𝑇) = 1  for n, i >  0 
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So we include the implied binomial probability into a binomial option pricing 
model in accordance with Cox et al. (1979): 
𝑃𝑖
𝑛(𝑇) = [𝜋 𝑃𝑖+1𝑛+1(𝑇 − 1) + (1 − 𝜋) 𝑃𝑖𝑛+1(𝑇 − 1)] 𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) 
Path-independency implies that a downstate followed by an upstate equals an 
upstate followed by a downstate: 
ℎ(𝑇 + 1)ℎ∗(𝑇)ℎ∗(1) = ℎ∗(𝑇 + 1)ℎ(𝑇)ℎ(1) 
Since ℎ∗(𝑇) can be expressed as a function of ℎ(𝑇), we simplify the equation 
and obtain: 
ℎ(1) = 1
𝜋 + (1 − 𝜋)δ   
where δ is some constant. The first-order linear difference equation ℎ(𝑇) has a 
general solution in the form: 
ℎ(𝑇) = 1
𝜋 +  c δT   
where c is some constant. As we know that at the immediate future ℎ(0) = 1, 
we obtain the unique solution: 
ℎ(𝑇) = 1
𝜋 +  (1 − 𝜋)δT   
We transform ℎ(𝑇) to ℎ∗(𝑇) and get: 
ℎ∗(𝑇) = δT
𝜋 +  (1 − 𝜋)δT   
Knowing 𝜋 and δ permits the determination of the arbitrage-free model of the 
term structure in a dynamic environment.  
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Exemplarily, we get the discount factors for the maturities T=0, 1, 2, 3. The 
binomial probability 𝜋 is 0.5, the constant δ is 0.95 and  𝑃00(𝑇) = 𝑒(−0,1∗𝑇). 
Table 4.1: Perturbation function in a two-state framework, exemplarily 
𝑻 0 1 2 
𝒉(𝑻) 1,0000 1,0256 1,0512 
𝒉∗(𝑻) 1,0000 0,9744 0,9488 
 
Figure 4.2: Ho/Lee process 
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After adjusting the term structure with the perturbation function, we can derive 
the yield curve (internal rate of return) as conducted with the estimation of the 
discount function. 
𝑟(𝑇) = − 1
𝑇
ln (𝑃(𝑇)) 
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4.3.3.3 Term structure movement with a three-state environment 
Bühler and Schulze (1993) extended the binomial model of Ho and Lee (1986) 
by introducing a third state in the estimation of the term structure movement. 
This third state refers to a “no change” of the discount function. Bühler and 
Schulze (1993) observe that a no change state is common when considering 
monthly data. They follow the proposal of Bliss and Ronn (1989) who detect 
similar findings for US government bonds. 
The assumptions as outlined in the model of Ho and Lee (1986) are valid with 
the following additions: 
• The transition of the discount function is enhanced by a third state that 
refers to a no change of the discount function with the respective 
perturbation functions: 
                                 𝑃𝑖+2𝑛+1(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇+1) 𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) ℎ𝑢(𝑇)         Upstate (U) 
     𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇)                       𝑃𝑖+1𝑛+1(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇+1) 𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) ℎ𝑛(𝑇)         No change (N)         
                                      𝑃𝑖𝑛+1(𝑇) =  𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇+1) 𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) ℎ𝑑(𝑇)         Downstate (D) 
• Path-independency eases calculation in the sense that we have at time n 
only 2n+1 states instead of 3n states. 
According to Bühler and Schulze (1993), there are the following perturbation 
functions that fulfill the arbitrage-free model: 
ℎ𝑢(𝑇) = 1
𝜋2+2𝜋(1−𝜋)δT+(1−𝜋)2δ2T , ℎ𝑛(𝑇) = δTℎ𝑢(𝑇), ℎ𝑑(𝑇) = δ2Tℎ𝑢(𝑇) 
with 0<π , δ<1 
Where 𝜋2 refers to the risk-neutral probability for an upstate, 2𝜋(1 − 𝜋) for a 
no change and (1 − 𝜋)2 for a downstate of the discount function. According to 
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the model of Ho and Lee (1986), we can derive the term structure by just 
knowing the parameters 𝜋 and δ and the initial discount function. 
Applying the same parameters as used for the binomial approach, we obtain 
with 𝜋=0.5, δ=0.95, 𝑃00(𝑇) = 𝑒(−0,1∗𝑇) and maturities T=0, 1, 2, 3 the following 
discount function: 
Table 4.2: Perturbation function in a three-state framework, exemplarily 
𝑻 0 1 2 
𝒉𝒖(𝑻) 1,0000 1,0519 1,1051 
𝒉𝒏(𝑻) 1,0000 0,9993 0,9974 
𝒉𝒅(𝑻) 1,0000 0,9494 0,9001 
 
Figure 4.3: Bühler/Schulze process 
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Hence, we can determine the term structure by estimating the parameters 𝜋, δ 
and 𝑃00(𝑇). More precisely, 𝛿 explains the spread between the perturbation 
functions. A large spread refers to great interest rate volatility. Vice versa, for 
𝛿=1 we have certainty about the term structure movement.  
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4.3.3.4 Pricing of the option premium in multi-callable bonds 
The specifications for the option pricing of multi-callable bonds are outlined in 
Bühler and Schulze (1993). We highlight some important specifications: 
• The option premium is the difference between the non-callable bond and 
the callable bond. In other words, if the inner value is higher than the 
option premium, then the termination is favorable. 
• The typical call option can be exercised at certain points in time with a 
specified notice period. The termination may not be economically 
beneficial if the interest rate is increased during the notice period. 
However, the terms of the contract outline that the termination cannot be 
withdrawn. So the cost for refinancing the bond has to be taken into 
account. 
• The termination can imply transaction costs 𝑇𝐶 that occur for the issuance 
of a new bond. 
The option premium is determined by applying the trinomial model with a 
recursive valuation from the last call date in a three step approach.  
Step 1: call premium from the last call date 𝑁𝑐 
The option premium 𝐶(𝑁𝑐,𝑖) depends on the price of the non-callable bond 
𝐵(𝑁𝑐,𝑖): 
• Minus the exercise price 𝐸𝑁𝑐. 
• Minus the present value of the accrued interests in the notice period 
𝑐 ∙ 𝑁𝑃, where c stands for the coupon rate. 
• Plus the present value of the short term interest rate 𝑟(𝑁𝑐,𝑖) for 
refinancing the bond. 
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The correction terms consist of the accrued interest and refinance risk so that the 
inner value 𝐶(𝑁𝑐,𝑖) is calculated by: 
𝐶�𝑁𝑐,𝑖� = 𝐵�𝑁𝑐,𝑖� − 𝐸𝑁𝑐 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝐾𝐹 ∗ �1 + 𝑟�𝑁𝑐,𝑖��−𝑁𝑃 + 𝐸𝑁𝑐 ∗ (1
− �1 + 𝑟�𝑁𝑐,𝑖��−𝑁𝑃) 
This can be rearranged in the form:  𝐶(𝑁𝑐 , 𝑖) = 𝐵(𝑁𝑐 , 𝑖) − (𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑃 + 𝐸𝑁𝑐) ∗ �1 + 𝑟(𝑁𝑐 , 𝑖)�−𝑁𝑃 for 𝐶(𝑁𝑐 , 𝑖) ≥ 𝑇𝐶  
𝐶(𝑁𝑐 , 𝑖) = 0    otherwise. 
More precisely, the option premium levies an inner value when transaction costs 
are exceeded. 
Step 2: Call premium at any time when termination is not possible 
Similar to the model of Ho and Lee (1986) in the case of a two-state model, the 
option premium can be calculated in a three-state model as: 
𝐶(𝑛, 𝑖) = �𝜋2 ∗ 𝐶(𝑛 + 1, 𝑖 + 2) + 2𝜋(1 − 𝜋) ∗ 𝐶(𝑛 + 1, 𝑖 + 1) + (1 − 𝜋)2
∗ 𝐶(𝑛 + 1, 𝑖)� ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) 
Step 3: optimal exercise strategy and option premium when exercising the 
option is possible 
When exercising the option is possible, we calculate the relation between the 
call price 𝜙(𝑛, 𝑖) and the option premium 𝐶∗(𝑛, 𝑖) as derived from the trinomial 
model. 
𝜙(𝑛, 𝑖) =  𝐵(𝑛, 𝑖) − 𝐸𝑛 − 𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑃 ∗ �1 + 𝑟(𝑛, 𝑖)�−𝑁𝑃 + 𝐸𝑛 ∗ �1 − �1 +
𝑟(𝑛, 𝑖)�−𝑁𝑃�   =  𝐵(𝑛, 𝑖) − (𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑃 + 𝐸𝑛) ∗ �1 + 𝑟(𝑛, 𝑖)�−𝑁𝑃  
85 
 
for 𝜙(𝑛, 𝑖) ≥ 𝑇𝐶 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜙(𝑛, 𝑖) = 0   otherweise 
The exercise price 𝐸𝑛 and 𝑟(𝑛, 𝑖) refers to the interest rate of the notice period 
𝑁𝑃. So the option premium is calculated by: 
𝐶(𝑛, 𝑖) = max�𝐶∗(𝑛, 𝑖);Φ(𝑛, 𝑖)� 
The optimal exercise strategy is given when the call price 𝜙(𝑛, 𝑖) is greater than 
the calculated option premium 𝐶∗(𝑛, 𝑖). Given this assumption, the optimal 
exercise strategy can be recursively derived for all states and time (n,i). We 
begin with the current call price 𝐶(0,0) and the price of the callable bond 
𝐵𝑐(0,0). 
Finally, the price of the non-callable bond in the immediate future is given by: 
𝐵𝐶(0,0) = 𝐵(0,0) − 𝐶(0,0) 
Where 𝐵(0,0) is the price of the non-callable bond derived from the term 
structure movement. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Discount function 
We estimate the parameters π and δ for the discount function at the beginning 
and the middle of each month. As the estimation of the parameters π and δ is 
possible 12 months from the observation period, we consider here the time 
period from January 2005 to September 2010. With this approach, we obtain 68 
parameters for the transition from the beginning to the beginning and middle to 
middle of the following month, respectively. We optimize the parameters by 
applying the Newton-Raphonson method. 
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Figure 4.4: Parameter estimation for the transition of a month’s beginning 
 
Comparing the parameter estimation, we observe for both transitions that the 
implied probability π is exposed to greater volatility than the spread of the 
perturbation function δ. This is caused by the sensitivity of δ. We interpret this 
outcome with a great uncertainty in modeling the term structure during the 
financial crisis. The spread of the perturbation function sharply declines during 
the financial crisis for both transitions. 
Figure 4.5: Parameter estimation for the transition of a month’s middle 
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Table 4.3: Estimation of the discount function parameters 
Discount function 
estimation 
Transition beginning to 
beginning 
Transition middle to 
middle 
 π δ π δ 
Number of estimations 68 68 68 68 
Mean 0.5397
 
0.9981726 0.5121226 0.9976919 
Std. 0.1138
 
0.0007053 0.0716881 0.0010214 
Min 0.2553
 
0.9960210 0.3098087 0.9950685 
Max 0.8445
 
0.9989937 0.6410514 0.9990463 
Median 0.5288
 
0.9984909 0.5255841 0.9979885 
 
The implied probabilities 𝜋2, 2𝜋(1 − 𝜋) and (1 − 𝜋)2 serve as risk-neutral 
probabilities in the context of Cox et al. (1979). This means that the bond price 
equals the expected bond price at the end of the period discounted by the one-
period bond rate:  𝑃𝑖𝑛(𝑇) =  [𝜋2 ∗  𝑃𝑖+2𝑛+1(𝑇 − 1) + 2𝜋(1 − 𝜋) ∗ 𝑃𝑖+1𝑛+1(𝑇 − 1) + (1 − 𝜋)2
∗  𝑃𝑖𝑛+1(𝑇 − 1)] ∗  𝑃𝑖𝑛(1) 
Controlling for the disturbance term, the parameter δ determines the volatility of 
the term structure. If δ is near 1 and the spread between the perturbation function 
is small, then there should be only one possible state. Vice versa, if δ decreases, 
the difference of the future term structure deviates more significantly from the 
observed term structure. 
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4.4.2 Results option premium 
4.4.2.1 Single-callable bonds 
The price deviation is most pronounced for the sub sample from July 2007 to 
September 2009. Prior to the financial crisis, price deviations are small 
indicating that market quotes and model-conform valuation converge. The 
results support the hypothesis that the market is more cautious under stress that 
puts a challenge to accounting complex financial products. From November 
2008, there is a persisting price deviation that is linked to the government 
bailout of Commerzbank on November 2, 2008. 
Table 4.4: Price deviation single-callable bonds 
Deviation 
(x=EUR) 
Number of observations 
  2/2005 – 5/2010 2/2005 – 6/2007 7/2007 – 9/2009 
12≥x> 11 -  -  -  
11≥x> 10 -  -  -  
10≥ x > 9 -  -  -  
9  ≥ x > 8 -  -  -  
8  ≥ x > 7 -  -  -  
7  ≥ x > 6 -  -  -  
6  ≥ x > 5 3 1.4% - 
 
3 3.7% 
5  ≥ x > 4 3 1.4% - 
 
3 3.7% 
4  ≥ x > 3 6 2.7% - 
 
6 7.3% 
3  ≥ x > 2 21 9.5% 3 2.2% 18 22.0% 
2  ≥ x > 1 68 30.9% 46 33.3% 22 26.8% 
1  ≥ x > 0 64 29.1% 38 27.5% 26 31.7% 
0  ≥ x >-1 22 10.0% 18 13.0% 4 4.9% 
-1 ≥x > -2 11 5.0% 11 8.0% -  
-2 ≥ x >-3 21 9.5% 21 15.2% -  
-3 ≥ x > 4 1 0.5% 1 0.7% -  
Total 220 100% 138 100% 82 100% 
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Figure 4.6: Option premium mispricing in Euro, single-callable bonds 
 
4.4.2.2 Multi-callable bonds 
Given our hypothesis that the market is more cautious under stress, we expect 
deviations of the option premium in relation to the model-conform valuation of 
multi-callable bonds as well. Observing the option premium over the time period 
from January 2005 to September 2009, the outcome is two-fold. Prior to the 
financial crisis, the deviations are rather small although not negligible. Pricing, 
however, becomes critical in times of stress. There is a persisting 
underestimation of the option premium with deviations in the excess of up to 6 
Euros in Q4 2008. By Q3 2009 the option premium returns close to the model-
conform valuation. So the most significant deviation occurs in Q4 2008 and lasts 
for one year until Q3 2009. 
As we detect strong support for the pricing problem hypothesis, we intend to 
relate the outcome to a certain time period. Table 4.5 presents the overall results 
with a frequency distribution of the deviations. As such, there is a strong 
frequency cluster for deviations in the excess of up to 2 Euros in the overall 
observation period. Breaking down the results in a narrower time frame, we 
divide the table in a pre-crisis and a crisis period. We define the time period 
from June 2005 to June 2007 as the pre-crisis period and the time period from 
July 2007 to September 2009 as the crisis period. There is apparently a strong 
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mismatch in the sub-periods. During the financial crisis, there is a persisting 
underestimation meaning that market prices are higher than the model-conform 
valuation. The most intense pricing gap of the option premium occurs in an 
extended period from November 2008 to June 2009. We bring this outcome into 
the context of the financial services industry. We do not explicitly relate our 
findings to the bank failure of Lehman Brothers since the mispricing of the 
option premium occurs two months after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 
However, we could relate the mispricing in terms of a lagged price effect with 
concerns about the financial sector. Moreover, the option premium mispricing is 
most pronounced by the fact of government support. 
Eurohypo was a subsidiary of Commerzbank that struggled in the financial 
crisis. Finally, Commerzbank had to claim for government bailout in order to 
operate its business. On November 2, 2008, Commerzbank was granted 
government support via the Special Financial Market Stabilization Fund 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz, FMStG). Due to this fact, we can relate the 
significantly higher option premium to this event. Even emphasized, we provide 
evidence that in times of increasing default risk, the mispricing of model-
conform valuation is most pronounced. 
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Table 4.5: Price deviation multi-callable bonds 
Deviation 
(x=EUR) 
Number of observations 
  6/2007 -9/2009 6/2005 – 6/2007 7/2007 – 9/2009 
13 ≥ x >  12 1 0.3% -  1 0.6% 
12 ≥ x >  11 0 0.0% -  0 0.0% 
11 ≥ x >  10 2 0.6% -  2 1.1% 
10 ≥ x >  9 3 0.9% -  3 1.7% 
9   ≥ x >  8 4 1.1% -  4 2.2% 
8   ≥ x >  7 6 1.7% -  6 3.3% 
7   ≥ x >  6 8 2.3% -  8 4.4% 
6   ≥ x >  5 4 1.1% -  4 2.2% 
5   ≥ x >  4 5 1.4% -  5 2.8% 
4   ≥ x >  3 13 3.7% 6 3.5% 7 3.9% 
3   ≥ x >  2 31 8.9% 15 8.8% 16 8.9% 
2   ≥ x >  1 39 11.1% 5 2.9% 34 18.9% 
1   ≥ x >  0 73 20.9% 33 19.4% 40 22.2% 
0   ≥ x > -1 56 16.0% 28 16.5% 28 15.6% 
-1  ≥ x > -2 42 12.0% 24 14.1% 18 10.0% 
-2  ≥ x > -3 21 6.0% 18 10.6% 3 1.7% 
-3  ≥ x > -4 28 8.0% 27 15.9% 1 0.6% 
-4  ≥ x > -5 10 2.9% 10 5.9% 0 0.0% 
-5  ≥ x > -4 4 1.1% 4 2.4% 0 0.0% 
Total 350 100% 170 100% 180 100% 
 
Figure 4.7: Option premium mispricing in Euro, multi-callable bonds 
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The mispricing hypothesis is emphasized when employing test statistics. We test 
whether the difference between model-conform valuation and market prices in 
the financial crisis is significantly different than prior to the financial crisis. The 
time period is cut off in July 2007. We reject the null hypothesis with highly 
significant test statistics. 
Table 4.6: Test statistics option price deviation 
Indicators  Single-callable bonds Multi-callable bonds 
t-statistics -3,6912*** -3.1012*** 
xuntil July 2007 0,6802 1.2586 
xafter July 2007 1,2571 2.3399 
*** indicate highly statistical results at the 1% significance level 
4.4.3 Optimal exercise strategy 
After presenting the significant mispricing of the option premium during the 
financial crisis, we investigate under what conditions the early termination of 
multi-callable bonds is most likely. Figure 4.8 exhibits all possible call dates and 
the covered bonds yield curve. We detect that the current covered bonds yield 
curve is a good indicator for the termination of callable bonds. More precisely, 
when the yield of the multi-callable bond is higher than the covered bonds yield 
curve, the early termination of the callable bond is most likely. Vice versa, when 
the yield of the multi-callable bond trades at a discount to the yield curve, then 
the termination is less probable. 
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Figure 4.8: Exercise of call option 
 
4.5 Summary and conclusion 
In this study, we question the appropriateness of models to price the option 
premium in multi-callable bonds. As such, we apply a case study analysis for 
multi-callable bonds from Eurohypo. We differentiate the deviation of market 
prices and model-conform valuation between a time period prior to the financial 
crisis and a crisis period. We hypothesize that models are suitable in regular 
markets since most models rely on idealized conditions. However, the 
assumptions may be violated in times of stress so that there is a persisting 
deviation from the market value. 
Our results highlight that there is a significant deviation of market prices from 
model-conform valuation. This may seem rather intuitive since stress periods 
ignite a more volatile market environment and the reliance on idealized market 
conditions suffer. However, we discover that an increase of default risk causes 
the mispricing and not contagion effects in the financial services industry. 
Furthermore, we present that the covered bonds yield curve serves as a suitable 
indicator for determining the early termination. The results show that in the 
presence of an inner value, exercising the call option is more likely. While this 
finding is in line with the option pricing theory, it is still astonishing since the 
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termination of a bond usually triggers the issuance a new bond particularly in 
the financial crisis. This is surprising since refinancing via the bond market was 
expected to be tense. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
The motivation of this doctoral thesis is to improve our understanding of the 
interconnection of structured finance and the financial crisis. While media 
coverage on structured finance and its sub-forms like securitization was mainly 
negative, the presented studies show that generalization is not justified. 
Three research questions are the building blocks of this doctoral thesis that were 
of relevance in the financial crisis. In chapter 2, I investigate the impact of rating 
announcements of securitizations. In chapter 3, I examine the investment 
practices of institutional investors and determine the risk and return 
characteristics by including securitization. In chapter 4, I examine the 
appropriateness of option pricing models in structured finance products during 
times of stress. 
In Chapter 2, I find strong evidence that rating announcements of securitization 
have a strong impact. However, the impact is limited to the announcement day. 
This indicates that activity in structured finance or securitization is not in 
general negative. When cross-checking the effect with rating announcements on 
the long-term outlook of a financial institution, the impact of rating 
announcements is much more pronounced. Given this outcome, the bank wide 
overall risk is the key determinant in the investor’s perspective. Suggestion for 
future research is to examine the impact of rating announcements on 
government bonds as this is an up-to-date issue. 
In chapter 3, the investment practices of institutional investors show distinctive 
differences with regard to the investment policies they are exposed to. I detect 
that institutional investors following the prudent person rule achieve higher risk-
adjusted returns than those following the quantitative portfolio restriction 
approach. In addition to that, securitization is not suitable in the portfolio of 
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institutional investors after the outbreak of the financial crisis due to the weak 
performance. I explain the rapid decline of securitization in the financial crisis 
since primarily institutional investors sold securitization in the financial crisis. 
Suggestion for future research is to explore the outperformance skills of 
institutional investors for other countries than USA, UK and Germany. 
In chapter 4, the option pricing in callable bonds is explored. Since valuation 
methodology is quite complex, I show that in normal times model-conform 
valuation and market prices converge. Nevertheless, this becomes more 
challenging in times of stress resulting in strong deviations from valuation 
principles. Suggestion for future research is to quantify the price deviation since 
this is caused from increased default risk. 
Taken together, structured finance and securitization have become an 
established investment opportunity. Due to the predominant opinion that risk is 
coated with structured finance, market participants are obliged to restore 
investor confidence with high quality products. If this target is pursued, the 
continuation of structured finance as a success story in the financial service 
industry may seem likely. 
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